TOWARD A VIBRANT PERUVIAN MIDDLE CLASS: EFFECTS
OF THE PERU-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
ON LABOR RIGHTS, BIODIVERSITY, AND
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
Stephen J. Powell & Paola A. Chavarro***
I.

BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A. Objectives of Present Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B. General Effects of International Trade on
Labor Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C. General Effects of International Trade on
Biodiversity and Indigenous Populations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

II.

PERUVIAN ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE FTA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A. Employment: Formal and Informal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B. Competitiveness of Peruvian Industries.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C. Traditional Export Products. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

III.

THE FLEEING POPULATION : EMIGRATION IN PERU . . . . . . . . . . 109
A. The Decision to Emigrate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
B. Emigration Levels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

IV.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE POSSIBILITIES FOR
PERUVIAN AGRICULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

V.

BIODIVERSITY AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS IN PERU .. . . . . 113
A. Peru’s Strategic Ecosystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B. Peru’s Indigenous Peoples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
C. Medicinal Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

VI.

DETAILS OF THE PERU -UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A. Promotion and Protection of Worker Rights . . . . . . . . . . . 117

* Lecturer in Law and Director of the International Trade Law Program, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law, University of Florida, former Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
** J.D. summa cum laude 2002 Universidad de la Sabana, Bogotá; Specialization in
Commercial Law summa cum laude 2004 Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá; LL.M. in
International and Comparative Law cum laude 2005 University of Florida College of Law,
Gainesville; former Associate Attorney, Abogados Asociados, Bogotá 2003-2004.
93

94

FLO RID A JOU RN AL O F IN TERNATIO N AL LAW

[V ol. 20

B. Environmental Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C. Dispute Settlement Chapter as a Tool to Enforce
Labor and Environmental Commitments
Under the Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
D. Agricultural Matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
E. Textile and Apparel Matters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
VII.

EFFECTS OF THE PERU -U.S. FTA.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A. Direct Employment and National Growth Effects. . . . . . . . 125
B. Social and Labor Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
C. Indirect Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
D. Long Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
I. BACKGROUND
A. Objectives of Present Study

The International Trade Law Program at the University of Florida has
explored in some depth the general impact of trade rules on human rights.
Our premise is straightforward. Trade and human rights are inextricably
linked because trade rules weaken the ability of governments to promote
sustainable development, to alleviate the widening gap between rich and
poor, to ensure core labor rights among their workforce, to deter
trafficking in women and farm workers, to address devastating levels of
disease, to preserve indigenous and other cultural identities, and even to
sustain democratic governance.1 Warning that purposeful coordination of
these two critical public policies is “ignored only at the peril both of trade
and human rights agendas,” we argued that ”trade negotiators must ever
be mindful that global trade rules do not operate in a vacuum, but instead
cohabit a world of preexisting human rights laws—articulated most often
by demands of the labor and environment sectors, but underpinned by even
more basic human rights of individuals such as the right to education and

1. See Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements, and the Rule of Law in the
Americas: The Human Rights Face of Free Trade Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 59, 61 (2005)
[hereinafter Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements]. See also Berta E. Hernández Truyol, The
Rule of Law and Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 167, 191-92 (2004).
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freedom from oppression—that simply should not, in any sensible system
of laws, be contravened by narrow economic precepts.”2
We examined first the global rules, marking the surprisingly numerous
direct linkages between trade and human rights in World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements.3 While concluding that international
trade rules have done little with their commanding strength to avoid
conflict—much less promote conscious integration—with human rights
law, we identified an arsenal of WTO provisions that stand ready for use
as instruments of this necessary task. The general exceptions of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT’s) Public Health and
Welfare Clause contain numerous examples of potential shelter from the
foundational non-discrimination premises of global trade rules. From the
protection of public morals to measures aimed directly at ensuring public
health to guarantees of a healthy environment, GATT Article XX, as
interpreted broadly by the WTO’s new world trade court, has set a hopeful
path toward elevating human rights policies above economic ones. The
world trade court’s ready embrace of other public international law to aid
interpretation of WTO provisions adds further optimism by bringing into
play other customary and treaty sources of human rights law. 4
From the global trade rules and these more visible and controversial
linkages between international trade law and international human rights
law, we turned to regional economic arrangements and the Americas to
uncover the more indirect or hidden linkages between trade and human
rights. Our focus was on the contribution of regional free trade agreements
(FTAs)–primarily the rich trove of such pacts found among the nations of
the Western Hemisphere–to the rule of law. The rule of law, the definition
of which in our usage includes the substantive ingredients of justice and
fairness, is basic to enjoyment of human rights.5 We hypothesized that
FTAs, by their necessary ground rules and quite without meaning to do so,
have pronounced effects on attainment of rules-based governance.
We found strong anecdotal evidence that FTAs indeed contribute to
enjoyment by civil society in general, and not solely by those involved in
international trade, of rules-based governance. Regional trade agreements
2. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements, supra note 1, at 61.
3. Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization Rules,
16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 219 (2004).
4. Id. at 230.
5. Application of the rule of law is included, along with open and transparent civil
institutions, in the list of the trappings of democracy, which was affirmed as a human right by the
United Nations in 1999, C.H.R. res. 1999/57/ U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/57 (1999). See DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 540 (Anderson
Pub. 3d ed. 2001).
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require governments to conduct their activities in a more transparent and
expeditious manner, relying exclusively on administrative records created
with input from all affected members of civil society. These agreements
mandate that government measures be subject to substantive review by an
independent and accessible judiciary. They require transparency,
accountability, and due process by governments. Dispute settlement
systems in FTAs similarly promote timeliness, inclusive record keeping,
and impartiality in the administrative decisional process. 6
That further work is needed became clear from our finding that “the
rule of law” remains an inaccessible objective unless defined within the
context of specific cultural premises and combined with the substantive
norms that frame the concept for use in a particular society. Moreover,
FTAs cannot directly inject rules-based governance into a country. Only
national governments can ensure the success of the rule of law for their
citizens. Outside sources such as international treaties can only lend a
“helping hand” to governments in their transformation of these FTAs into
legislation, regulations, policy guidance, and administrative measures that
will contribute to previously established national objectives to promote
rules-based governance. 7
We have reached the stage of our project in which this theoretical
background, substantial though it may be, must be tested within the
context of a particular culture and a single trade agreement. We have
chosen Peru and the recently signed Free Trade Agreement between Peru
and The United States. Our task is to examine the direct and indirect
effects of this agreement on human rights of Peruvian civil society. In
doing so, we first will look at the Peruvian economic situation prior to
negotiation of the FTA, specifically in regard to labor, biodiversity, and
indigenous populations. Then we will consider the content of the treaty
itself in order to focus on the effects that specific provisions of the treaty
could have on the Peruvian economy’s more marginalized groups. Finally,
we will conclude with recommendations that we hope will be helpful in
taking full advantage of the FTAs benefits for Peruvian civil society—and
the rule of law—and which may inform governments with respect to future
trade negotiations.
Our objective in this Essay will be to suggest small steps governments
may consider to take full advantage of the benefits generated by the FTA
and to soften adverse impacts the agreement certainly will generate in
certain sectors of the economy.

6. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements, supra note 1, at 97.
7. Id. at 70.
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B. General Effects of International Trade on Labor Rights
Governments of developing countries universally oppose linking trade
concessions to labor standards.8 Leaders of these lesser-developed
countries (LDCs) argue convincingly that requiring payment of higher
wages, enforcing restrictions against child labor, and insisting on
collective bargaining rights in their factories has the inevitable
consequence of reducing the comparative advantage of poorer countries
in the global market. If developed countries deny access to goods from
LDCs based on noncompliance with labor standards, the LDCs argue,
companies in such nations never will gain the economic strength needed
to raise the wages of their workers and otherwise to match the labor
standards of the markets to which they seek access. They accurately draw
attention to the fact that one could find fault with the same developed
nations now insisting on global observance of labor standards, because
these nations failed to observe such standards before their own industrial
revolutions made attention to worker rights possible. 9
Governments of LDCs fear also that the motivation of developed
countries in their attempts to link trade access with labor rights is less the
protection of LDC worker rights than yet another disguised means of
protection for domestic industries in developed countries. In asking
whether their cynicism is well founded, we may remind ourselves that
virtually every provision in the nearly two dozen agreements of the WTO
is drafted with a view to guarding against such hidden protection of
domestic industry in contravention of the GATT’s Four Pillars. WTO
Members have been creative indeed in sculpting border
restrictions—purportedly aimed at food safety, protection of the
environment, or ensuring against consumer fraud—to favor their own
producers.10 Lesser-developed nations also find support for their
skepticism in the insistence by powerful labor unions in the United States
that labor standards be included in free trade agreements with LDCs. 11

8. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World
Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, Introduction and
Summary, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 589 (2004).
9. Industrialization is, of course, no guarantor of a government’s sensitivity to human rights,
as the situation in China attests.
10. Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (ban on imported salmon to prevent pathogen infestation
of native stocks, but no ban on herring imports that were more likely to infest native stocks but for
which Australia had no domestic industry).
11. Sidney Weintraub, The United States and the Future of Free Trade in the Americas, 6
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We could avoid the difficult question of whose opinions to accept if we
could discover a set of universally acknowledged minimum labor
standards that trade rules should help to enforce. The WTO is not the place
to find such principles. Despite continued urging by the United States and
other developed nations,12 the WTO unambiguously has ceded all matters
relating to labor standards to the International Labor Organization (ILO).
In its definitive 1996 Singapore Declaration, trade ministers, while
affirming their non-binding commitment to observance of “internationally
recognized core labor standards,” pointed to the ILO as the “competent
body to set and deal with these standards,” albeit with the continuing
“collaboration” of the WTO Secretariat.
Trade and labor experts credit the WTO’s 1996 commitment to
“internationally recognized core labor standards” as the telling impetus
that led directly to ILO consensus two years later in resolving the longcontentious issue of exactly which are the “core” labor standards in the
context of trade agreements.13 The ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work concludes in its Preamble that the ILO must
adopt these principles in furtherance of its pledge to maintain tight
linkages between economic growth and social progress. The Declaration
establishes that the principles that nations must provide to ensure that
workers have equal opportunity to share in the wealth they helped to
generate are those contained in the adopted ILO Conventions.14 The
Declaration groups these core labor standards into four categories: (1)
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; (2) the
elimination of forced or compulsory labor; (3) the abolition of the worst
forms of child labor;15 and (4) elimination of discrimination in the

NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 303, 304 (2000). We might have greater willingness to accept such
union advocacy as an example of international union solidarity, not domestic protectionism, but for
near-universal union opposition to trade liberalization of any sort. Thomas J. Manley & Luis
Lauredo, International Labor Standards in Free Trade Agreements of the Americas, 18 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 85, 95-96 (2004). At the rank and file level, many workers do indeed support better
working conditions for their counterparts in other nations. This motivation is reflected in the keying
of wage proposals to living standards in the LDC, not in the developed market.
12. Manley & Lauredo, supra note 11, at 91.
13. Petersmann, supra note 8, at 590.
14. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No.
87); Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105);
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111); Equal Remuneration
Convention, 1951 (No. 100); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182) (considered part of the array).
15. Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, ILO No. C182 (June 17, 1999),
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C182.

2008]

TO W ARD A VIBRAN T PERU VIAN M ID D LE C LASS

99

workplace.16 Each of these standards is expressly identified as a human
right by the U.N. human rights conventions.
Adopted by overwhelming majority,17 the Declaration provides ILO
Members have an “obligation arising from the very fact of membership in
the Organization, to respect, to promote, and to realize” these principles
even if they have not ratified the Conventions from which they are drawn.
The Declaration lends credence to the concerns of LDC representatives 81
with language overtly imported from the WTO Singapore Declaration:
WTO Ministers “reject the use of labour standards for protectionist
purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries,
particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into
question.” 91
The ILO Declaration thus closes: “labour standards should not be used
for protectionist purposes” and “the comparative advantage of any country
should in no way be called into question by this Declaration.”20 These two
provisions have the evident intent of smoothing the path toward adoption
in trade agreements of compulsory compliance with core labor standards.
This intent notwithstanding, one can see the potential for inherent
contradiction in a Declaration that identifies the “fundamental rights” of
workers while simultaneously recognizing that, for certain countries, the
very ability to participate in the global market relies on not fully granting
these rights to their citizens.21 For example, the ILO’s Minimum Age

16. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Sess., Geneva
(June 1998) pmbl. & art. 2, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_
jump?var_language=EN&var_pagename=DECLARATIONTEXT (last visited May, 6, 2008).
17. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: History, at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.DECLARATIONHISTORY?var_language
=EN.
18. We remind readers the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a statist body that does not
question the legitimacy of extant government officials to represent the best interests of their
citizens.
19. Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC ¶ 4 (Singapore Dec. 13, 1996), http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. We would hardly have expected
developed countries to admit complicity in protectionist practices and the desire to deny LDCs their
comparative advantage, particularly in the midst of multilateral negotiations styled the “Doha
Development Agenda.”
20. Id. art. 5.
21. In general, the minimum age for employment of children should not be less than the age
of completion of compulsory schooling, although never less than 15 years. In developing countries,
a minimum age of 14 years may be applied where the economy and educational facilities are
insufficiently developed. Sometimes, light work may be performed by children two years younger
than the general minimum age. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
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Convention prohibits employment of children under 15 years of age.
However, for nations whose economy and educational facilities are
insufficiently developed, the minimum age drops to 14 years.22 Does the
need for education to meet a child’s present and future human rights
depend on the economic development of the country in which the child
happens to reside?
Juxtaposed with these opposing principles is an argument against
attempting to force a single global “cookie-cutter” model on all states
without account of their level of economic development. Under this
approach, treatment of workers that may be considered a violation of
human rights in one country should pass muster as a fair labor standard in
another, at least until the latter country’s development reaches some
minimum level. The hidden danger in this view is the assumption that
economic growth alone is the guarantor of worker rights. Profits are not
wrenched from companies in favor of workers solely because they are
higher in a given year. In developed countries, advances in worker rights
take place because workers and their supporters insist on these rights,
using the weapon of non-performance to enforce their entreaties. In LDCs,
human rights for workers rely upon committed and informed governments.
Nonetheless, the Declaration also makes it clear that these rights are
universal, and that they apply to all people in all states, regardless of the
level of economic development. It particularly mentions groups with
special needs, including the unemployed and migrant workers. It
recognizes that economic growth alone is not enough to ensure equity and
social progress, or to eradicate poverty. 32
C. General Effects of International Trade on Biodiversity and
Indigenous Populations
The trade regime has produced negative economic and cultural
outcomes for indigenous populations by rewarding work that is
inconsistent with the nature-sensitive ways of subsistence lifestyles, by
promoting unsustainable resource use, and through diversion of

[hereinafter ILO Declaration on Rights at Work], Effective Abolition of Child Labor (discussing
child labor issues), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static_jump?var_
language=EN&var_pagename=ISSUESCHILDLABOUR.
22. Convention 138 Minimum Age Convention, ILO Doc. C138, art. 2.4 (June 26, 1993),
http://www.itcilo.it/actrav/ english/common/C138.html. The Convention permits “light work” that
does not interfere with schooling at age 13 (12 for LDCs). Id. arts. 7.1 & 7.4.
23. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work: History, supra note
17.
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governments from long-range social priorities with the promise of quick
riches.
Because trade rules give teeth to intellectual property protections,
multinational companies have been able to appropriate to great profit
traditional knowledge essential to indigenous culture. These same trade
rules, however, deny communal inventions any share of the royalties
earned by their use. This chapter explores the nature of trade’s
intersections with indigenous populations and evaluates policies
governments can adopt both to promote trade and to protect indigenous
knowledge and natural resources.
The “traditional knowledge” that struggles in the trade intersection is
the historical use by indigenous peoples of herbs and other plant resources
for curative, agricultural, or other purposes that may have been practiced
for hundreds of years, but without the written documentation expected of
patentable ideas by Western intellectual property law, including the TRIPS
Agreement. Protection of traditional knowledge from biopiracy and
development of rules that provide economic rewards for the knowledge is
an important aspect of trade’s effect on indigenous populations.
The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations adopted the most
direct attempt to delimit the human rights of indigenous populations. The
Draft Declaration on Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples24 (Draft
Declaration) remains soft law because the broader membership of United
Nations has not adopted it. Article 4 of the Draft Declaration identifies the
right of indigenous peoples “to maintain their distinct political, social, and
cultural characteristics while retaining the right to participate fully, if they
choose to, in the political, legal life of the State.” Article 7 affirms that
indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right not to be
subjected to “ethnocide and cultural genocide,” the strength of the
language an indication of the importance to local communities of
preserving their ethnic and cultural identity if they are to continue at all as
distinct indigenous peoples.
Article 30 of the Draft Declaration reaches far indeed. In this Article,
the right of indigenous peoples to determine the “development of their
lands and other resources” (including mineral and water) is confirmed. In
addition, indigenous populations, we are told, have the right to require that
states obtain their “free and informed consent” before the State approves
a project that would affect those lands or resources. Approval by states of
resource extraction projects to advance the economic development of the
24. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Draft Convention on Discrimination Against
Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29/ Annex I (Aug. 23, 1993), http://www.cwis.org/
drft9329.html.
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majority, in the form of investment contracts with multinational
corporations, without the knowledge or against the wishes of tribal
populations, has caused irreversible hardships to native communities
whose future generations rely on the sustainable use of the natural
resources located on indigenous land.
II. PERUVIAN ECONOMY PRIOR TO THE FTA
A. Employment: Formal and Informal
If Andean countries are to gain populist support for opening internal
markets to global competition, the decisive concern in negotiating their
respective free trade agreements with the United States is the virtual
certainty that unemployment levels will increase in those sectors that
cannot compete with U.S. imports. The negotiating challenge is to balance
these job losses against gains in those sectors in which the country has a
comparative advantage over U.S. producers. Therefore, to determine the
possible effects of a free trade agreement, we must—like Andean
negotiators—consider the particular situation in the country under study.
In Peru, as in many other developing economies, governments face the
challenges of creating better employment opportunities, reducing the large
percentages of the population engaged in the “informal economy,” and
improving working conditions. Noted Peruvian labor analyst Fernando
Villaran found that unemployment affects 5.7% of the “formal” Peruvian
economic population, while over half the population is under-employed
and only about one-third has adequate employment. The Peruvian active
economic population consists of almost 12 million people, of whom
almost 700,000 are unemployed. Thirty-five percent of those who have
found jobs work for the private sector, 10% for the public sector, and 53%
in some form of self-employment.25 In assessing the effects of the Peruvian
FTA, it is essential to take into consideration these already high levels of
unemployment in the formal economy and high levels of participation in
the so-called “informal economy.”
Peru’s informal workers join the 80 million informal workers in the
Americas, with 57 million unemployed or underemployed.26 Most of those

25. Juan Flores, La Situación Laboral en el Perú [The Labor Situation in Peru], available at
http://www.monografias.com/ trabajos6/sila/sila.shtml (last visited May 6, 2008).
26. Marie-Claire C. Segger, Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the FTAA, 27
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1118, 1119 (2004).

2008]

TO W ARD A VIBRAN T PERU VIAN M ID D LE C LASS

103

who are self-employed work in the informal economy. This sector consists
mostly of small family units that operate with very low productivity levels
and are unable to face the costs that the formal economy implies, such as
taxes, fees, and other financial expenses. The strategy of this informal
sector is only to survive because they lack the means to enter the formal
sector of the economy.27 Peru’s Ministry of Labor and Employment
Promotion estimates that as much as 60% of those seeking employment in
the cities work in the informal sector and concentrate their activities in the
trade of goods and services. Informal workers are characterized by their
low educational and training levels.28
Regarding unemployment rates, it has been argued that structural
unemployment levels in the Andean countries have grown as a
consequence of several factors. The first factor is the relatively rapid
market opening process of Andean countries, which facilitated the entry
of foreign investment and modern technology, established high
productivity standards, and increased the demand for more qualified labor.
A second factor is the imbalance between the labor market demand for
qualified labor and the non-qualified labor supply. A third factor could
arguably be the increase of imports which reduces the domestic demand
for local products, one of the inevitable downsides of trade that leads to the
decline of domestic industry, thus creating lay offs because of lessened
demand for labor.29
In Peru, as in all of Latin America, the high unemployment level
among young people between 15 and 24 years old is a worrisome fact.
This figure is considerably higher than those found in adult unemployment
rates. Youth unemployment rates are strongly related both to low
education levels and household income.
The lack of employment opportunities or the existence of employment
with precarious salaries and poor work conditions usually turn into social
problems such as social exclusion, undermining of social cohesion,
rampant crime, and violence in general, which in turn, are detrimental to
economic growth.

27. Victor E. Tokman, “De la Informalidad a la Modernidad” [From an Informal to a Modern
Economy], Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/infoecon/docs/
486/F1558379380/Tokman%201.pdf .
28. Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion of Peru, Program of Statistics and Labor
Studies, Boletín de Economía Laboral [Bulletin of Labor Economy] 22-24 Year 6, Oct. 2002
[hereinafter Boletín de Economía Laboral], available at http://www.mintra.gob.pe/peel/
publicaciones/bel/BEL_22-24.pdf (last visited May 6, 2008).
29. Flores, supra note 25.
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Important facts that have had an effect on labor must be considered.
The first of them was the demographic explosion that occurred between
1960 and 1980 which caused people who were born during this time to
enter the labor market in the 80’s and 90’s creating a labor supply surplus,
and thus, putting strong pressure on employment and remunerations. A
second factor is the continuous and mass migration from rural areas to
urban areas and the increase of female participation in labor which has
caused not only unemployment but also an increase in informal and subemployment.
Other important factors have been the inability of the productive sector
to absorb the labor surplus, causing a lot of workers to occupy positions
below their qualifications in order to keep their employment and the lack
of adaptation of the educational system to the demands of the productive
sectors. 03
These latter facts are evidenced by the rates of workers with university
(46.7%) or technical education (55%) and those that do not carry out
activities related to their profession or qualification or are under using their
skills in their employment.
According to the Peruvian Ministry of Labor and Employment
Promotion, the rate of labor activity in the urban regions of Peru is 67.7%,
meaning that 7 out of 10 people capable of work participate in the labor
market. The average unemployment rate in the urban regions of Peru is
about 8%, and the average under-employment rate for the same regions in
2001 was over 47%. Rate differences between cities are due to the type of
economic activity developed in each region. Similarly, the remuneration
level also depends on the type of activities carried out in the different
regions. It is important to keep in mind that most workers in the principal
cities (73%) have basic educational levels. 13
In order to cope with labor related problems and improve its protection
of workers’ rights, Peru has undergone a fundamental labor reform in
recent years. In 2003, a major labor law reform was passed in order to deal
with restrictions that were remnants of the Fujimori presidency. The
reform reduced the number of workers needed to establish a union,
eliminated prohibitions that kept workers from joining unions during their
probationary period, limited the power of the labor authority to cancel a
union’s registration, and removed prohibitions on the political activities of
unions. This amendment also repealed compulsory arbitration
requirements that limited the right to strike in essential services and was

30. Boletín de Economía Laboral, supra note 28, at 22-24.
31. Id.
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followed by a regulation ensuring that union dues of public employees are
collected according to the intent of union members.
In 2004, regulations to strengthen labor inspections and broaden labor
inspectors’ powers were published, allowing easier access to firms,
improving inspectors’ ability to impose sanctions, and increasing the level
of fines. Likewise, Peru modernized the electronic system for tracking
wage and hour data to ensure that workers are paid all wages due.
Additionally, in 2005, new labor law legislation was introduced addressing
anti-union discrimination and the right for unions to determine the criteria
for striking. At an international level, Peru has also ratified 71 ILO
conventions—including all eight of the core conventions. 23
On the other hand, the 2005 human rights report of the U.S.
Department of State found instances of forced and other illegal child labor
violations of Peruvian law and a general inability of the small staff of
Peru’s Ministry of Labor to conduct adequate inspections. Because of the
large informal employment sector, less than half of Peru’s population
earns the minimum wage. The report also noted problems with Peruvian
labor laws themselves, primarily in permitting companies located in one
of Peru’s four export processing zones to exceed the 20% cap on
temporary employment contracts, which prevents greater unionization. 33
B. Competitiveness of Peruvian Industries
A study by Peru’s Economy Institute identified three primary aspects
of the country’s competitiveness challenge. The factors are poverty,
education, and the predominance of micro-enterprises. With an average
per capita income of about US$2,000 annually, poverty is of course a
competitiveness factor in Peru. The poor have reduced access to
educational opportunities and to the nutritional and health care needed to
make them fully productive members of society. 43

32. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REAL RESULTS ON LABOR RIGHTS FACTS
ABOUT PERU’S LABOR LAW PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, U.S.—P ERU TRADE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT POLICY BRIEF (Dec. 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_
Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file163_8548.pdf.
33. Levin Warns of Democratic Opposition to Peru FTA as Labor Groups Rally, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 17, 2006, available at http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply_nl_txt.asp?f=wto
2002.ask&dh=44966635&q= (last visited May 6, 2008).
34. Carlos Oliva et al., Obstáculos para el aumento de la competitividad en el Perú
[Obstacles for the Increase of the Competitiveness in Peru], at 12, Peruvian Economy Institute
Study No. 2002-081 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.ipe.org.pe/publicaciones/docs/2002081%20CAF.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008).
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A second factor, highlighted both by businesses and by UNESCO, is
the quality of education. According to UNESCO, education in public
schools is not of the highest quality and drop-outs rates are high.
Businesses complain of their inability to find workers with the educational
skills to perform difficult tasks. The lack of educational quality would
explain the low productivity levels of the average educated workers. As a
result, labor productivity is low and more than half of the workers with
secondary education and almost a third of workers with higher education
levels earn less than a dollar an hour. 53
A third factor is the average size of the Peruvian business. According
to the Ministry of Labor, 57% are micro-enterprises, companies with less
than 10 workers, and many of these are not part of the formal employment
sector, even though they are responsible for 18% of the country’s GNP. A
study by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics estimated that
35% of micro-enterprises have no labor benefits and less than 1%
complies with all required labor benefits.36 Big businesses account for 29%
of GNP with only 5% of the productive units, thus showing the
relationship between business size and productivity.37
We will mention again and again a further productivity factor identified
by the study. The small technological and scientific base in Peru result
from failing to exploit modern communication and information
technologies, as well as the need to commit government funds to private
investment in research and development. 83
C. Traditional Export Products
Regarding the agricultural sector, coffee has traditionally been the main
agricultural product of exportation. According to the Peruvian Ministry of
Agriculture, coffee represents almost half of the agricultural exports and
about 5% of total exports, with its principal destination markets being the
United States, the European Union, and Japan.
Similarly, cotton has traditionally been the most utilized raw material
in the textile industry. Even though Peru produces five varieties of cotton,
cotton production faces a severe crisis that has caused the increase of
cotton imports from various sources such as China, Bolivia, the United
States, Argentina, and Australia. 93
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Products

Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Ministry of Agriculture of Peru, Principales Productos de Exportación Tradicional [Main
of Traditional Export], http://www.minag.gob.pe/agricola3.shtml (last visited Jan. 31,
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For the most part, Peruvian exports are still predominantly minerals
and metals, which are capital-intensive sectors and do not depend so
heavily on labor nor do they include a significant added value.
Manufactured exports, on the other hand, represented only around 21% of
total exports in 2000—percentage well below the Latin American average
of 58%. In general, according to the Peruvian Economy Institute, the
export of goods does not represent more than 13% of the GNP and is
highly dependent on traditional products. 04
Even though Peru has been highly favored by the price increase of
minerals, which constitutes an important part of the Peruvian exportsupply, the most spectacular growth has been evidenced in non-traditional
exports which registered a growth of more than 35%. This has had a
positive impact on employment because non-traditional products require
significantly more labor force. Furthermore, this growth has been positive
for the Peruvian economy given the fact that prices of non-traditional
products are not subject to the drastic changes in international supply and
demand, as is the case of traditional commodities pricing.41
Even though the United States is one of Peru’s biggest commercial
partners, in general the Peruvian economy is somewhat diversified since
a considerable percentage of its trade is carried out with Europe
(approximately 30%), Asia (approximately 20%), and other countries in
the hemisphere. 24
The percentage of goods that are traditionally exported to the United
States (approximately 30%) has increased thanks to the ATPDEA.
Through the ATPDEA, which was enacted in 2002, the United States
granted unilateral preferential tariff treatment to Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru in order to facilitate the eradication of drug-crops.
However, this benefit was effective only through December of 2006.
According to the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Commerce and
Tourism, the tariff-free entrance in to the American market of a significant
number of Peruvian products has proven to be essential for the growth of
exports and employment. In this sense, the average annual growth of
Peruvian exports to the United States has been approximately 13% over
the last 10 years.

2008).
40. Oliva et al., supra note 34.
41. Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism of Peru, Peru-United States FTA
Communications Unit, Peru-United States FTA: Nociones Clave [Key Notions], at 6, Feb. 2005
[hereinafter Key Notions], available at http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/downloads/documento/
TLCPeru-Estados_Unidos_Nociones_Clave.pdf.
42. Oliva et al., supra note 34.
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The ATPDEA has increased economic activity and formal employment
on a more regional scale. According to the Peruvian Ministry of Labor, the
cities largely benefited from the employment increase generated by
exporter companies are Piura, Ica, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Áncash,
Chincha, and Arequipa. Between January and September 2004, the
employment increase of companies with 10 or more workers located in the
mentioned cities was higher than the employment increase in Lima.43
The increasing U.S. demand for Peruvian apparel, favored by the
ATPDEA, has generated approximately 80,000 jobs and has raised
worker’s remunerations in the sector. The textile and apparel sector is one
of the greater sources of employment. It is estimated that the sector’s
productive chain generates around 350,000 direct jobs and that more than
10% of the Peruvian population depends on an employment directly or
indirectly generated by an activity related to the textile and apparel
industry chain.
In general, the apparel industry, which has benefited from the
ATPDEA, is characterized as labor-intensive and requiring relatively low
investment. The ATPDEA, which permitted the apparel exportation to the
United States free of tariffs since August 2002, has increased the activity
level, the demand for qualified labor, and the salaries of occupations
connected to apparel exports. According to the National Institute of
Statistics and Informatics, in the third trimester of 2004 the employment
rate in the apparel industry grew 21.5% from the same period of the
previous year. In this regard, the United States has become the principal
destination for Peruvian textile and apparel exports.
The textile-apparel sector represents almost 15% of the Peruvian
industrial production, 9% of total exports, and employs approximately
350,000 direct workers. More precisely, 106,000 direct and indirect jobs
depend on textile and apparel export industry. It is estimated that the U.S.
demand alone generates between 70,000 and 80,000 direct and indirect
jobs, most of them closely related to the ATPDEA.44
In 2004, a study entitled “ATPDEA Sectoral and Regional Impacts”
indicated that more than 194,000 Peruvians have jobs that directly depend
on the exports that enter the United States free of tariffs thanks to the
ATPDEA, and around 550,000 Peruvians have jobs indirectly related to
U.S. exports.45

43. Key Notions, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism of Peru- Peru-United States FTA
Communications Unit, El TLC y el Agro, at 8, May 2005 [hereinafter FTA & Agriculture],
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In short, according to the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Commerce and
Tourism, the Peruvian exports to the United States benefited by the
ATPDEA preferential tariff treatment have created more than 745,000
direct and indirect jobs. Likewise, this Ministry estimates that the PeruU.S. FTA could generate a net gain of around 81,000 additional jobs,
mainly in the agricultural sector, which implies more and better
employment on more of a regional scale.
III. THE FLEEING POPULATION : EMIGRATION IN PERU
A. The Decision to Emigrate
The Krugman model of center-periphery46 about labor mobility and
regional development postulates that the most productive regions (centers)
offer better salaries and thus stimulate migration from less productive
regions (periphery). Given the low costs of transportation, migration is
made easy. The flow of workers is related to the region’s development,
with development understood to mean the leap from an agricultural to an
industrialized economy.47 The lack of employment opportunities and
economic equality are some of the most influential factors for migration
in Peru. There are two different migration movements, one internal from
rural to urban areas within Peru and one at a more international level.
The decision to migrate is explained by the hope of higher income
offered by the chosen destination and has caused some 90 million people
worldwide—3% of the global labor force—to leave their homes for
employment in other countries.48 This explains the reason why some
countries and urban centers are so attractive for immigrants. In Peru, the
internal migration has been emphasized by migration from the rural areas
to the city centers. A substantial number of peasants and farmers travel to
the surrounding cities in the region and particularly to Lima. 94
Peasants and farmers that migrate to coastal cities are low skilled
workers, and thus they become street vendors or informal workers that live
in the marginal sectors of the cities. Lima alone makes up one third of the

available at http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/downloads/documento/folleto%20mincetur.pdf (last
visited May 9, 2008).
46. Boletín de Economía Laboral, supra note 28, at 22-24.
47. Id.
48. PHILIP MARTIN ET AL., MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
7 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
49. Hernando de Soto, THE OTHER PATH [El Otro Sendero] (ILD 1992).
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Peruvian population and this proportion is ever increasing. This
uncontrolled migration has caused most of individuals and families that
come to Lima to occupy uninhabited lands, especially near the mountains,
building precarious dwellings and incrementing the rate of extreme
poverty. 05
In general, due to their precarious situation, immigrants accept
employment that local populations would not accept or otherwise create
their own work alternatives because they cannot afford the wait in finding
a job. Immigrants face lower unemployment rates and higher underemployment levels than local populations. Consequently, the likelihood of
getting the lowest paid jobs is higher for immigrants.51 However, as one
study puts it, “[w]hat is worse than being exploited abroad? Not being
exploited abroad.” 25
B. Emigration Levels
At an international level, according to the data provided by the
Peruvian National Department of Immigration and Naturalization and the
National Institute of Statistics of Peru, it is estimated that approximately
2.5 million Peruvians live abroad. Between 1996 and 2003 around 5.8
million Peruvians left the country. The largest group of emigrants (51%)
went to other South American countries, 37% went to North America, and
7% to Europe. From the 51% that went to other South American countries,
most of them chose a bordering country, especially Chile, Bolivia, and
Ecuador. Argentina and the United States followed in importance.
Only 4.8 million returned to Peru. The majority of this migratory
balance of almost one million individuals or 58% settled in a bordering
country such as Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador while 29% did so in the
United States. Ninety percent of the migratory balance for the period
between 1996 and 2003 is found somewhere in the Americas.
An alarming fact is that according to the existing data, the technical and
professional population constitutes a considerable proportion of Peruvian
emigrants. Between 2000 and 2003, nearly a million professionals and
technicians left the country, or almost 29% of the total number of
Peruvians that left the country. This information indicates an important
phenomenon of international emigration in Peruvian society, where

50. Julio Calderón Cockburn, La mirada demográfica, DESCO Seminar concerning Cities,
June 15, 2004, at http://www.desco.org.pe/eventos/ciudades/DEMOGRAFIApercent20Juliopercent
20Calderon.doc.
51. Boletín de Economía Laboral, supra note 28, at 22-24.
52. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 8.
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professionals and technicians constitute one of the most significant
emigrant groups in search of more favorable conditions to improve their
situation. One of the principal destinations of this group is the United
States, made up of 24% professionals and 7% technicians, followed by
Chile (16% and 5%), Bolivia (11% and 3%), Argentina (6% and 2%),
Ecuador (6% and 2%), Spain (4% and 1%), and Italy (1.2% and 0.3%). 35
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRADE POSSIBILITIES FOR
PERUVIAN AGRICULTURE
According to the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture, Peru participates in
international trade playing a role of a small supplier with its exports
representing about 0.5% of the worldwide agricultural trade.54 According
to the WTO, Peru is considered to be a Net Food Importer Developing
Country due to the fact that its trade balance is usually deficient in regard
to food.55 From 1980 to 2001, Peru has registered a systematically negative
agro-commercial balance amounting to an average deficit.56
Historically, the traditional Peruvian exports have been coffee, cotton,
and sugar. However, in the 1990s, non-traditional exports substantially
increased their participation in export value, reaching 65% of the total
agricultural exports in 2001.57 In 2000, the agricultural exports reached
US$680 million, equal to 9.7% of the total value of exports and 132%
greater than export value in 1990.58
In 2005, the ten most exported agro-products alone generated 350,000
jobs,59 a number that keeps growing due to the significant quantity of
products with tremendous potential to be exported. In 2004, Peru was the
fastest growing agro-exporter country with 67 new agricultural products
such as asparagus, olives, mango, grapes, yellow onions, beans, cacao

53. César Germaná et al., Una aproximación a la emigración internacional del Perú. Perú,
sociedad de transición (III) [An Approach to the International Emigration of Peru. Peru, Society
of Transition (III)], in CÉSAR GERMANÁ ET AL., LA MIGRACIÓN INTERNACIONAL. EL CASO PERUANO
[INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION. THE PEURVIAN CASE] (2005), available at http://www.lainsignia.
org/2005/diciembre/ibe_074.htm.
54. Ministry of Agriculture of Peru, El Comercio Internacional y las Posibilidades del Agro
Peruano [The International Trade and the Possibilities of the Peruvian Land], available at
http://www.minag.gob.pe/agricola2.shtml (last visited May 8, 2008).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. FTA & Agriculture, supra note 45, at 7.
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grain, chirimoya, lemon, lentil beans, broad beans, and roses among
others.60
Non-traditional agro-exports, according to the Agricultural
Businessmen Association, represented approximately 40,000 hectares in
2001 (with a set goal of 200,000 hectares in 5 years), located mainly on the
coast.61 These non-traditional agro-export products are produced by midsize farmers with access to credit resources and superior levels of
technology.
Despite this growth, one of the main problems of the Peruvian
agricultural sector has been the impossibility to generate a modern agroexport sector able to compete in world markets. Some of the main
problems are the landscape fragmentation combined with the lack of
organization of agricultural producers, which have reduced the
possibilities of farmers to effectively compete in the world market.
The land in the agricultural areas is highly fragmented. Eighty-four
percent of agricultural units are smaller than 10 hectares and they represent
around 50% of total lands.62 This is an obstacle for the development of
economies of scale because it has resulted in higher-priced agricultural
supplies, production, and commercialization of products and has reduced
the farmers’ capacity to obtain credit or re-orient their crops to agro-export
crops. 36
“During the last decade the agricultural GNP has increased around
5.7% annually despite the international financial crisis and the internal
political crisis.”64 In general, the agricultural sector has been the third most
productive sector (8.9%) behind manufacturing (14.9%) and commerce
(14.3%).65
Most of the additional growth comes from agricultural expansion
which has been founded mainly on the augmentation of cultivated
landscapes as opposed to significant productivity or labor increases.
Consequently, it has been argued that this growth has been produced
within a low profitability context due to falling prices and high production
costs.

60. Id. at 7.
61. Ministerio de Agricultura [Ministry of Agriculture of Peru], Plan Estratégico Sectorial
Multianual-Sector Agricultura 2002-2006, at 4 [Multiannual Sectorial Strategic Plan-Sector
Agriculture 2002-2006] Dec. 2001, available at http://www.minag.gob.pe/politica.shtml (last
visited May 8, 2008).
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
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In 2000, the Peruvian population was estimated around 25.7 million
people from which 7.1 million (30%) were rural populations.66 In turn,
31% of the economically active population in the rural areas works in
some type of agricultural activity. 76
Despite the important changes at a social and economic level, poverty
is still an essential trait of the rural sector. According to the National
Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), in 2001, 70% of the rural
population was considered poor while 35.6% were living in conditions of
extreme poverty.68 This is closely related to the low productivity level of
the labor force in agriculture.
An analysis by the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and
Informatics of Peruvian living standards showed that poverty affects
mostly small farmer-families and sustenance growers, while commercial
farmers and non-agricultural rural populations are less vulnerable to
extreme poverty.69 Another factor that limits productive development is the
low level of technological innovation and public investment in research
which restricts the farmers’ capacity to increase productivity improving
the transformation process after the harvest and the consequent
commercialization.
Regarding the commercialization of agricultural products, the Peruvian
system lacks the proper infrastructure to offer nationwide agricultural
production in the largest of Peruvian cities, which results in losses for
producers. Currently, the agricultural sector depends on legal provisions
such as the Forest Law, the Sanitation Law, the Law of Seeds, the Law of
Agricultural Promotion Investment, and the Water Law that jointly
endeavor to encourage private activity, to improve the participation of
producers, to generate employment, and to stimulate local, regional and
national economic growth while guaranteeing the sustainable management
of natural resources. 07
V. BIODIVERSITY AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS IN PERU
A. Peru’s Strategic Ecosystems
Pioneer ecologist Edward O. Wilson explains that the richness of

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Ministerio de Agricultura, supra note 61, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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biodiversity in Peru’s rain forests follows a general principle of biology
known as the latitudinal diversity gradient.71 The largest numbers of
species occur in the equatorial regions of South America, Africa, and Asia.
Wilson posits the case of vascular plants, that is, flowering plants, ferns,
and a mix of lesser groups. Together these groups constitute 99% of land
vegetation. Of the 250,000 known species, 170,000 (or 68%) occur in the
tropics and subtropics, especially in the rain forests.72 For example, Peru
and its neighboring Andean countries of Colombia and Ecuador account
for 40,000 of these species with just 2% of the world’s land mass.73 By
way of contrast, only 700 species may be found in all of Canada and the
United States, ranging from the mangrove swamps of Florida to the
coniferous forests of Labrador. 47
Peru possesses strategic ecosystems that constitute a very important
factor in international negotiations. Peru is one of the five countries with
the largest tropical rainforests in the world, and it is considered a megadiverse country due to its vast diversity regarding ecosystems, species of
flora and fauna, genetic resources, and cultures. According to the Peruvian
Ministry of Agriculture, Peruvian forests are home to 11% of the world’s
wild fauna species and 8% of the world’s flora.75
Likewise, as a genetic source, Peru possesses around 25,000 flora
species (10% of the world’s total amount), 128 species of domesticated
plants, and 4,400 native plant species with known usages in the nutritional,
cosmetic, ornamental, aromatic, and medicinal fields, among others.76
Bioprospecting77 from Peru’s countless plant types of new chemical
products of strategic importance for the pharmaceutical and cosmetic
industries is one of the great potentials in Peru.
Even though two-thirds of the Peruvian territory (around 78 million
hectares) is covered by tropical forest and most of it has potential for
permanent forest production, the forest sector represents only around 0.5%
of the GNP.78

71. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. WILSON, supra note 71.
77. The systematic search for new sources of compounds, genes, enzymes, whole organisms,
and other products that have potential economic value and can be found in our biodiversity. Ana
Sittenfeld, Biodiversity, Bioprospecting, and Intellectual Property: The Case of Costa Rica and
Merck Pharmaceuticals, Lecture at Univ. of Fla. College of Law, Feb. 27, 2006 (on file with
authors).
78. Key Notions, supra note 41.
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The Peruvian Amazon has 46 million hectares of forest suitable for
exploitation, with an estimated productive capacity of 2.3 million of cubic
meters.79 Even though wood exports total only US$70 million annually,
uncontrolled forest exploitation has caused reduction of wild fauna
because wood is obtained without following sustainable forest
management practices. 08
Peru also possesses a diversity of cultures. Fourteen linguistic families
and at least 44 different ethnic groups are located in the Amazon regions.
These indigenous populations possess important knowledge regarding the
use and properties of plant and animal species concerning their nutritional
and medicinal value and their genetic resources. 81
B. Peru’s Indigenous Peoples
According to the 1993 census, Peruvian indigenous populations
represented nearly a fifth of the total Peruvian population and were
estimated at 3.7 million, 85% of which were of Quechua origin. In 1994,
there were 1192 native communities and 5680 peasant communities. 28
In 2000, Peru’s indigenous population was estimated at 3.5 million
people and, according to the Peruvian living standards survey, most live
in the rural areas of the Sierra (61.2%), cities within the same region
(15.5%), and Lima (11%).83 In general, 70% of the indigenous population
lives in rural areas and the remaining 30% in urban areas.84 The ‘urban
indigenous peoples’ amount to a little over one million people, or about
7% of the Peruvian urban population.85
According to a study by Nestor Validivia of indigenous immigrants to
Lima and Cuzco, the principal motives behind the indigenous peoples’
emigration to urban zones are economic in nature. The indigenous peoples
immigrate to these zones in search of employment opportunities.86 Another

79. Sittenfeld, supra note 77, at 1.
80. Ministerio de Agricultura, supra note 61.
81. ANTONIO BRACK EGG, PERU’S BIODIVERSITY AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE,
CULTURAL BULLETIN OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2004), available at
http://www.chasquiperu.com/Y2N5_Edition/PeruBiodiversity.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
82. NÉSTOR VALDIVIA, ETNICIDAD, POBREZA Y EXCLUSIÓN SOCIAL: LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS
INMIGRANTES INDÍGENAS EN LAS CIUDADES DE CUZCO Y LIMA [Etnicidad, Poverty and Social
Exclusion: the Situation of the Indigenous Immigrants in the Cities of Cuzco and Lima], at 9,
available at http://www.amdh.com.mx/ocpi_/documentos/ docs/4/4/01/04/03.pdf (last visited May
8, 2008).
83. Id. at 10.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13.
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reason might be the status of the Quechuans as victims of the fight
between the army and the Maoist Shining Path. For the most part, urban
indigenous populations work as merchants, vendors, construction workers,
and in agricultural activities.87
Given that rural areas of Peru, which traditionally have been inhabited
by indigenous populations, continue to be the zones that register the
highest poverty levels, the indigenous peoples are forced to emigrate to the
cities.88 The situation for these immigrant indigenous populations is no
better in the cities. A worrisome indicator of the living and labor
conditions of the indigenous populations in cities is the extremely high
percentage of children between 5 and 13 years old that work (32%)
compared to the percentage of non-indigenous children that work (6%).89
Other factors that indicate the disadvantageous conditions of the urban
indigenous peoples are the lack of social security coverage, precarious
health conditions, and the lack of education.90 For the most part, the
Peruvian indigenous peoples are socially, politically, and economically
excluded from society. Despite the progress reached in recent years, there
are still obstacles to overcome. Some of those obstacles are the lack of
legal recognition of indigenous organizations and the violation of
indigenous peoples’ property rights. 19
C. Medicinal Plants
The herbal treatment of diseases has existed in Peru since the preColumbian age. Peruvian biodiversity has enormous potential not only in
the pharmaceutical sector and modern medicine but also in the perfume,
fragrance, soap, cosmetic, spice and seasoning, and pesticide industries,
among others. 29
A very interesting case of plants with medicinal properties is the native
berry called camu camu (Myrciaria dubia). Camu camu is a small tree
native to wetlands of the Amazon Basin and is especially abundant in
Peruvian Amazonia.93 Although very high in vitamin C, until recently

87. NÉSTOR VALDIVIA, supra note 82, at 13.
88. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 87.
91. Id. at 86.
92. Ministry of Agriculture of Peru, Exportación Agrícola No Tradicional: Principales
Líneas Emergentes [Nontraditional Agricultural Export: Main Emergent Lines], available at
http://www.minag.gob.pe/agricola42.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
93. Jim Penn, Camu Camu: A Conservation and Development Issue in Peru, available at
http://www.rainforestconservation.org/articles/camu-camu.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
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camu camu was used almost exclusively in Peru as fish bait and a
convenient source of firewood when dead.94 Then camu camu fruit pulp
became very popular and began to be exported, mainly to Japan. 59
Peru sought to protect against biopiracy not only camu camu but other
resources of Peruvian origin considered as priority resources by the
National Anti-Biopiracy Commission, through the search for potential
cases of biopiracy covering hercampuri, camu camu, yacon, caigua, sacha
inchi and chancapiedra.96 Peru also submitted a paper describing in detail
the case of camu camu for disclosure of origin purposes.97
Peru, led by India and joined by Brazil, has now taken its fight to the
next level by proposing an amendment to the WTO TRIPS Agreement that
would require the patent applicant to disclose the source of the genetic
materials such as plant life and traditional knowledge before being able to
receive a patent on biotechnological inventions.98 These countries charge
that bioprospectors from the First World have caused large economic
losses to Third World countries from biopiracy and that the suggested
disclosure requirement would reduce the chance that a patent would be
issued that is not based on new knowledge.99 The United States, Japan,
and, surprisingly, Argentina support a system of contracts between
bioprospectors and developing nations that give the companies permission
to research genetic materials and which commit the companies to share the
benefits of any patents later issued as a result of the research.100
VI. DETAILS OF THE PERU -UNITED STATES FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Promotion and Protection of Worker Rights
Labor obligations are part of the core text of the Peru-U.S. FTA. The

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. World Intelllectual Property Organization, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Eight Session Geneva, June
6 to 10, 2005, available at http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/ArchivosPortal/deinteres/5/2006/1-363/
wipo_grtkf_ic_8_12.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008).
97. Id.
98. India, Brazil, Peru Push for Text-Based Talks on Patent Disclosure, 24 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 11, Mar. 17, 2006, at 12 [hereinafter India].
99. Id.
100. Frances Williams, WTO Battle Looms Over Patents, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2006;
India, supra note 98, at 12.
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FTA reiterates the commitments assumed by the parties by virtue of the
1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and
sets forth internationally recognized labor rights such as the right of
association, right to organize and bargain collectively, a prohibition of the
use of any form of forced or compulsory labor, labor protections for
children and minors—including a minimum age for the employment of
children and elimination of the worst forms of child labor—and acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.101 Both parties have committed to strive to
ensure that their domestic laws provide for labor standards consistent with
internationally recognized labor principles and rights.102 Ironically, Peru
is said to have offered to incorporate these standards directly into the FTA,
but the United States demurred on the grounds that it did not wish to go so
far beyond the model of FTAs with other countries.103 Some participants
in trade promotion believe that the U.S. failure to pursue stronger labor
accords seriously impedes growth of middle classes in partner developing
countries.104
Similarly, the agreement reaffirms the complete respect for the parties’
political constitutions and legislations and the compromise so as not to fail
in effectively enforcing their labor laws in a manner that would affect trade
between the parties.105 The agreement also emphasizes that it is improper
to weaken or reduce domestic labor protections to encourage trade or
investment.106
The agreement requires the parties to effectively enforce their own
domestic labor laws.107 This obligation is enforceable through the
Agreement’s dispute settlement procedures and the FTA establishes
procedural guarantees to ensure both workers and employers the right to
defend themselves and to have fair, equitable, and transparent access to
labor tribunals.108

101. ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 21.
102. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. PERU TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENT
POLICY BRIEF, FREE TRADE WITH PERU: SUMMARY OF THE U.S.-PERU TRADE PROMOTION
AGREEMENT [hereinafter USTR Summary] (Dec. 2005), available at http://insidetrade.com/
secure/pdf8/wto2005_7248f.pdf; ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 21.
103. U.S., Peru Sign FTA, Portman Hopes for Passage Before Summer Recess, 24 INSIDE U.S.
TRADE 15, Apr. 14, 2006, at 1, 17.
104. Id. (quoting Rep. Sander Levin, Democratic Member of the House Ways and Means
Committee that must approve FTAs under U.S. law).
105. Id.
106. USTR Summary, supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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The FTA creates a Labor Affairs Council which will be in charge of the
implementation and development of the labor chapter and its labor
cooperation annex.109 Likewise, the agreement establishes cooperative
labor consultations which may be requested by any party regarding any
matter arising under the labor chapter.110 The consulting Parties shall make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter,
but if they fail to resolve the matter, the consulting party may request that
the Council be convened to consider the matter.111 If the matter concerns
whether or not a party failed to effectively enforce its labor laws in a
manner affecting trade between the parties, and the consulting parties have
failed to resolve the matter within 60 days of a the consultation request, the
complaining party may resort to the dispute settlement mechanism
provided for in Chapter 21 of the agreement.112
Similarly, the FTA establishes a labor cooperative mechanism to
promote a general respect for the principles embodied in the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and
compliance with ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child
Labor.113
The objective of the labor cooperative mechanism is the seeking of
bilateral or regional cooperative activities regarding labor fundamental
rights, law and practice related to the principles and rights of the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, compliance
with ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, methods to
improve labor administration and enforcement of labor laws, social
dialogue and alternative dispute resolution. Also, labor relations,
occupational safety and health, working conditions, mechanisms and best
practices to protect and promote the rights of migrant workers, social
assistance and training, technology and information exchange, labor
statistics, employment opportunities, gender, best labor practices, and
issues related to small, medium, and micro-enterprises, and artisans.
According to the before mentioned, under the FTA, Peru is committed
to comply with its own labor legislation and its international compromises
regarding labor, which strengthen worker’s rights. It is important to
emphasize that as a dissuasion formula, the non-fulfillment of labor

109. Business Roundtable, The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement and Labor, available
at http://trade.businessroundtable.org/trade_2006/peru/BRT_Labor.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Key Notions, supra note 41.
113. USTR Summary, supra note 102.
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obligations provided for by the FTA may lead to the imposition of a
considerable fine which would be utilized to improve labor matters.114
B. Environmental Protection
The Environment Chapter of the agreement recognizes the sovereign
rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to their natural
resources.115 In this sense, each party has the right to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its
environmental laws and policies. Nonetheless, the parties compromise to
continue improving their respective levels of environmental protection.
Environmental obligations, which are part of the core text of the trade
agreement, seek to contribute to the parties’ efforts to ensure that trade and
environmental policies are mutually supportive, to promote the optimal
use of resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, and to strive to strengthen the links between the parties’
trade and environmental policies and practices.
The agreement commits both parties to enforce their own domestic
environmental laws in an effective way. This obligation is enforceable
through the agreement’s dispute settlement procedure.116 Similarly, the
parties also commit to establish high levels of environmental protection
and to not weaken or reduce environmental laws to attract trade or
investment.117 However, the environmental chapter does not empower a
Party’s authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities
in the territory of another party.118
Likewise, the parties compromise to ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative proceedings are available under their laws to provide
sanctions or remedies for violations of their respective environmental
laws.119 It is important to emphasize that the agreement promotes a

114. Key Notions, supra note 41.
115. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PROPOSED UNITED STATES—PERU TPA
TEXTS, CHAPTER 18 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter CHAPTER 18], http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file852_8712.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2008).
116. USTR Summary, supra note 102.
117. Id.
118. Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism of Peru, Peru-United States FTA
Communications Unit, Peru-United States FTA: Resúmenes explicativos por Capítulos—Contenido
del Capítulo de Medio Ambiente, available at http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/downloads/
documento/Mediopercent20Ambiente.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008).
119. CHAPTER 18, supra note 115.
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comprehensive approach to environmental protection. It establishes
procedural guarantees, which ensure fair, equitable, and transparent
proceedings for the administration and enforcement of environmental
laws, complemented by provisions that promote voluntary, market-based
mechanisms to protect the environment.
Some of the mechanisms provided for by the treaty to reach this
comprehensive environmental protection are ones such as the creation of
a public submissions process to ensure that views of civil society are
appropriately considered. Benchmarking environmental cooperation
activities, and the mutual supportiveness of multilateral environmental
agreements and international trade agreements to which Peru and the
United States are parties.120
Chapter 18 of the agreement establishes an Environmental Affairs
Council which must consider and discuss progress in the implementation
of this chapter and the Environmental Cooperation Agreement, and strive
to resolve any controversies arising under this Chapter which could not be
settled through environmental consultations.121
A party may request environmental consultations along with another
party regarding any matter arising under this chapter.122 The consulting
parties must endeavor to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the
matter, but if they fail to resolve the matter through consultations, a
consulting party may request that the Council be convened to consider the
matter.123 If the matter concerns whether or not a party failed to effectively
enforce its environmental laws in a manner affecting trade between the
parties, and the consulting parties have failed to resolve the matter within
60 days of the consultation request, the complaining party may resort to
the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in Chapter 21 of the
agreement.124
Chapter 18 also includes an environmental cooperation agreement,
which provides a framework for undertaking environmental capacity
building in Peru, and establishes an Environmental Cooperation
Commission in order to develop a work plan for cooperative activities.125
This environmental cooperation agreement identifies a number of
priorities such as the strengthening of the capacity to develop, implement,
and enforce environmental laws, promotion of incentives to encourage

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

USTR Summary, supra note 102.
CHAPTER 18, supra note 115.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

122

FLO RID A JOU RN AL O F IN TERNATIO N AL LAW

[V ol. 20

environmental protection, protection of endangered species, promotion of
clean production technologies, and building capacity to promote public
participation in the environmental decisionmaking process.
A very distinctive aspect of this chapter is the inclusion of provisions
recognizing the importance of protecting biodiversity. Both parties
recognize the importance of conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity in order to achieve sustainable development, as well as the
importance of respecting and preserving the traditional knowledge and
practices of native communities in order to contribute to cultural,
economic, and social development.126
C. Dispute Settlement Chapter as a Tool to Enforce Labor and
Environmental Commitments Under the Agreement
Despite the cooperative spirit of the labor and environment chapters,
in which direct and mutually satisfactory solutions are preferred, those
chapters do allow resort to the Chapter 21 Dispute Settlement provisions
under enumerated circumstances. Article 17.6(6) of the Agreement
provides that if the matter under consultation concerns whether or not a
party failed to effectively enforce its labor laws in a manner affecting trade
between the parties, and the consulting parties have failed to resolve the
matter within 60 days of the consultation request, the complaining party
may request consultations under Article 21.4 (Consultations) or a meeting
of the Commission under Article 21.5 (Intervention of the Commission)
and, as provided in Chapter 21 (Dispute Settlement), thereafter have
recourse to the other provisions of that Chapter.127
Similarly, Article 18.9(6) of the agreement provides that if the matter
under consultation concerns whether or not a party failed to effectively
enforce its environmental laws in a manner affecting trade between the
parties, and the consulting parties have failed to resolve the matter within
60 days of the consultation request, the complaining party may request
consultations under Article 21.4 (Consultations) or a meeting of the
Commission under Article 21.5 (Intervention of the Commission) and, as
provided in Chapter 21 (Dispute Settlement), have recourse to the other
provisions of that chapter.128

126. CHAPTER 18, supra note 115.
127. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PROPOSED UNITED STATES—PERU TPA
TEXTS, CHAPTER 17 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter CHAPTER 17], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Asset_upload_file73_9496.pdf (last
visited May 8, 2008).
128. CHAPTER 18, supra note 115.
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According to both labor and environment chapters, no party may have
recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism provided in Chapter 21 for
any matter arising under any provision of those Chapters other than the
obligations contained in Articles 17.2.1(a) and 18.2.1(a).129 Said articles
establish the obligations not to fail to effectively enforce their respective
labor and environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the parties.
Therefore, these two obligations are the only obligations within the
environmental and labor chapters that may be subjected to the dispute
settlement mechanism provided by Chapter 21.130
It is important to take into account that the Chapter 21 dispute
settlement provides for dispute panel procedures which set high standards
of openness and transparency through open public hearings, public release
of legal submissions by parties, special labor or environment expertise for
disputes in these areas, and opportunities for interested third parties to
submit views. Even though Chapter 21 emphasizes promoting compliance
through consultation and trade-enhancing remedies, it establishes an
innovative enforcement mechanism which includes monetary penalties to
enforce commercial, labor, and environmental obligations of the trade
agreement.131
D. Agricultural Matters
The FTA permanently consolidates tariff-free preferential access for all
products included in the ATPDEA, such as asparagus, grapes, mangoes,
paprika, artichokes, dry grain legumes, tangerines, and ethanol.132 Going
beyond prior preferences for Peru, the agreement guarantees immediate
access to the U.S. market for new products such as olives, cotton fiber, and
fruits.133

129. Id.; CHAPTER 17, supra note 127.
130. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PROPOSED UNITED STATES—PERU TPA
TEXTS, CHAPTER 21 (Jan. 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_
TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file890_8715.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
131. CONTENIDO DEL CAPÍTULO DE SOLUCIÓN DE CONTROVERSIAS (CHAPTER OF DISPUTE
RESOLTUIONS—CHAPTER 21,) available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file144_9539.pdf (last visited May 8, 2008).
132. Contenido del Capitulo de Agricultura [hereinafter Agricultura], available at
http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/downloads/documento/Agricultura%2016%20FEB.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2008).
133. Id.
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Over 1,200 new customs classifications are added to the duty-free list
for Peru.134 With the present 388 duty-free products, immediate access to
the U.S. market is provided for 90% of the total agricultural products made
in Peru, which in turn represent 99% of the value of the Peruvian exports
to the United States.135 Notwithstanding the tariff elimination provided by
the FTA, there is a significant protective mechanism for the parties. The
agreement establishes that a party may apply an agricultural safeguard
measure in the form of an additional import duty on an originating
agricultural good listed in that party’s schedule, provided that some
conditions, such as the transparent implementation of the measure, are
met.136 Peru, according to the agreement, may apply agricultural safeguard
measures by volume to 36 sensitive products such as milk powder, butter
and dairy spreads, cheese, standard quality beef, chicken leg quarters, and
rice.137
In turn, Peru granted the United States duty free access to 451 customs
classifications, which represent 56% of the total classifications for
agricultural goods and 87% of the total amount imported from the United
States.138 Of these, 125 are sensitive products such as rice, dairy products,
meat, and yellow corn.139 Therefore, as protective mechanisms, Peru has
obtained annual linear decreases in tariffs of 10 years or more and has
established the application of agricultural safeguard measures for these
products.140
Similarly, the FTA contains important provisions dealing with its
implementation and the application of fundamental principles to ensure its
effectiveness. An important aspect of the agreement is its guarantee of the
application by both parties of the national treatment principle to the
products of the other party.141 Ensuring that each party treats products from
the other in the same manner by which it deals with its domestic products
ensures that the benefits of the FTA will be spread quickly and broadly
over each party’s production.

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PROPOSED UNITED STATES—PERU TPA
TEXTS, CHAPTER 2 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter CHAPTER 2], http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Draft_Texts/asset_upload_file374_8853.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2008).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Agricultura, supra note 132.
141. Id.
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Likewise, both parties commit to ensure that procedures to implement
and administer the tariff-rate quotas for agricultural goods set out in the
agreement are transparent, made available to the public, timely,
nondiscriminatory, responsive to market conditions, and minimally
burdensome to trade.142 As we discuss in Part VII, these are the types of
provisions that indirectly promote the rule of law, which benefits civil
society in general, not only farmers and growers in both countries.
Another important provision is the parties’ compromise to eliminate
export subsidies for agricultural goods and to prevent their reintroduction
in any form.143 In this sense, the agreement provides for the parties’
abstention to introduce or maintain any export subsidy on any agricultural
good destined for the territory of the other party.
Finally, the agreement provides for the creation of a committee on
agricultural trade comprised by representatives of both parties.144 This
committee will be in charge of the promotion of cooperation on the
implementation and administration of the agriculture section and the
consultation between the parties on matters related to this section.145
E. Textile and Apparel Matters
Another very important aspect of the agreement with a significant
impact on labor are provisions concerning textiles and apparel. Textiles
and apparel will be duty-free and quota-free immediately if the products
meet the agreement’s rule of origin.146 This result will have effects on U.S.
and Peruvian fiber, yarn, fabric, and apparel manufacturing.147
The FTA textile and apparel section expands the ATPDEA benefits by
including both old and new products such as synthetic or artificial fibers,
clothing, suitcases, briefcases, towels, tablecloths, umbrellas, fiberglass
manufactures, and comforters.148 The agreement also establishes a
transitional special safeguard, which provides for temporary tariff relief in
the event that, as a result of the reduction or elimination of a duty provided
for in the agreement, imports of goods benefiting from preferential tariff
treatment increase to unexpectedly high levels and cause serious injury or

142. CHAPTER 2, supra note 136.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. USTR Summary, supra note 102.
147. Id.
148. Contenido del Capítulo de Textil—Confecciones, http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/
downloads/documento/Textil.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
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threat to the respective domestic industry.149 In this case, the importing
party may apply a textile safeguard measure to that good to the extent
necessary to prevent or remedy the injury and to facilitate adjustment.
These safeguard measures consist of a suspension of the reduction of the
rate of duty provided for the agreement on the goods causing the injury or
an increase in the rate of duty on these products.
The agreement also establishes rules of origin, which guarantee that
only goods considered of U.S. and Peruvian origin will benefit from the
preferential treatment of the agreement, and customs cooperation
commitments between the United States and Peru, which will allow for
verification of claims of origin or preferential treatment.150
VII. EFFECTS OF THE PERU -U.S. FTA
A. Direct Employment and National Growth Effects
From a theoretical economic viewpoint, we would expect trade to
increase efficiency, wages, and employment while reducing poverty. As
each FTA partner takes advantage of its comparative advantages, it
benefits from specialization in export and production of goods in which
the country is more efficient, as well as from the lower prices of importing
the remaining goods from other countries that can produce them at lower
costs.151 That is at least the theory which underpins the tremendous growth
in international trade, a compelling leap of some 400% in the past 10
years.152 We also know that this theory does not mean that all countries
engaged in the global market, nor certainly all segments of civil society in
any country, will benefit equally from trade’s great and grinding growth
engine.
To compete in the global market, domestic industries must increase
their productivity. They may do so by importing new technologies and
implementing newer, more productive work methods. This increase in
work productivity reduces the number of workers needed for each unit

149. Id.
150. USTR Summary, supra note 102.
151. DANIEL MARTINEZ, EL MUNDO DEL TRABAJO EN LA INTEGRACIÓN ECONÓMICA Y LA
LIBERALIZACIÓN COMERCIAL. UNA MIRADA DESDE LOS PAÍSES AMERICANOS [The World of the
Work in Economic Integration and the Commercial Liberalization. A Glance from the American
Countries] (Lima: ILO/Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean—ILO International
Training Centre (Turin) 2004).
152. Id.
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produced and thus increases the industry’s competitiveness. The
productivity increase generates an increase in exports, which must increase
employment if it is to offset the reduction in the number of workers needed
for each unit of production.153
Peru’s trade agreement with the United States will be controversial, if
only because the continuous opening of markets to free trade, as Peru’s
government has done, inevitably disturbs the existing economic power
structure. Trade’s potential to work a rapid reduction in employment in
sectors in which the country does not hold any particular comparative
advantage guarantees opposition from affected industries.
However, the decrease in employment in these sectors should be
temporary because affected workers should eventually find jobs in
different sectors or learn new skills to qualify for employment. This was
the case of Mexico after NAFTA.154 To gauge the effects of the FTA on
employment levels, we must consider the primary employment sectors in
Peru, that is, minerals, fishing, agriculture, textiles, and refined oil. Peru’s
Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion estimates that imports
could displace local production in the labor-intensive agriculture and
textile sectors.155 However, the increase in exports in these sectors could
lead to an increase of new jobs if producers take advantage of the
opportunities created by the FTA.156 The export-related jobs should be
higher-paying work, leading to a doubling of new jobs through an increase
in indirectemployment. Small job losses can be expected in manufacturing
and chemical sectors.157
According to a study done by Universidad del Pacifico, the increase in
Peruvian exports to the U.S. market should increase overall economic

153. Id.
154. Carlos Patrón, Building Competitive Markets in Peru: The Case for Indecopi (on file with
authors).
155. Moron, Bernedo, Chavez, Cusato, Winkelried, TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO CON LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS: UNA OPORTUNIDAD PARA CRECER SOSTENIDAMENTE [Free Trade Agreement
with the United States: An opportunity for Sustainable Development], at 242 (Instiuto Peruano de
Economia 2005).
156. Id. at 242.
157. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME/MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION
OF PERU , EFECTOS DEL TLC CON EE.UU. SOBRE EL EMPLEO [Effects of the TLC with the U.S.
Employment] (Bruno Seminario de Marzi & Oswaldo Molina Campodonico Consultants) (Sept.
2004) [hereinafter Effects of the TLC with the U.S. Employment], http://www.perufrentealtlc.com/
files/Seminario%20Efectos%20del%20TLC%20sobre%20el%20Empleo.pdf.
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productivity.158 The FTA should also cause a rise in public spending,
subsidized through an increase in the sales tax.159
B. Social and Labor Effects
Just as the global market rewards high-technology labor (witness the
lower unemployment rates in Japan and the United States), so too will the
Peru-U.S. FTA offer greater benefits to skilled workers. Because Latin
America in general and Peru in particular have large informal economies
with substantial under-employment, competition from imports will be felt
more sharply until Peru substantially advances its policies not only to
fulfill the higher demand for skilled labor, including scientists and
engineers, but also to offer a social safety net for workers displaced by the
inevitable “evolution” of the labor market. As economists have noted, a
strong governmental commitment to free education in technological skills
is necessary to meet the demand for skilled labor created by international
trade. Eastern Asia has conquered the global market in large part because
of this commitment, which leads not only to lower unemployment but also
to social benefits in general.160
Increased growth from international trade has not led to the hoped-for
reduction of the gap between rich and poor in Latin America. Part of the
reason has no doubt been the traditional belief that Latin American
competitiveness depends on cheap labor and that governmental attempts
to increase the quality of life of workers would lead to lessened
competitiveness through increased labor costs. Labor demands increased
as expected with increased trade, but these were low-paying jobs that
reduced poverty levels, but could not narrow the income gap. The
technologically-skilled made increasingly-higher salaries while the
unskilled continued to earn low wages.161
Trade agreements generally deliver their strongest economic impact
during the first 5 years after implementation.162 For example, Vietnam
experienced a surge in U.S. foreign direct investment averaging 27%
annually during the first 5 years after entering into the Vietnam-U.S. Free

158. Moron et al., supra note 155, at 243.
159. Id. at 244.
160. BEETHOVEN H. VALENCIA, IMPACTOS SOCIOLABORALES DEL LIBRE COMERCIO
[SOCIOLABORALES IMPACTS OF THE FREE COMMERCE], http://www.perufrentealtlc.com/files/
HERRERA_Impactos_sociolaborales_del_ibre_comercio.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2008). See also
EDUARDO MORÓN, PACIFIC UNIV. RESEARCH CENTER, EVALUATION OF THE PERU-U.S. FTA ON THE
PERUVIAN ECONOMY (Mar. 2005), http://www.cocentes.up.edu_pe/EMoron/ DD0503.pdf.
161. VALENCIA, supra note 160.
162. Id.
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Trade Agreement, unexpectedly outpacing even the traditionally largest
investors from other Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and
Singapore.163 Investment from the United States into Mexico after the
NAFTA grew exponentially during the first half decade after the
agreement’s 1994 entry into force.
Experts who have studied Peru’s economic and political system caution
that these initial years after Peru’s trade agreement with the United States
will be crucial to the future of free market capitalism in the country.164
Structural reform in Peru has lagged behind that of its neighbors,
Colombia and Chile, and the nature of that reform has fanned nationalist
fervor,165 not unlike that being experienced by Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil,
and other South American nations for whom free market capitalism has
not delivered the economic self-sufficiency—at least for citizens
subsisting at the financial margins—that its proponents promised. Because
Peru is rich in gold, copper, and other mineral deposits, investment has
been capital intensive, creating wealth but few jobs. The rich are getting
richer, but poverty levels have not improved—half of Peru’s families
remain below the poverty line.166
Unless the government is able to use the economic growth that will
follow the Peru-U.S. trade agreement to reduce unemployment in both the
formal and informal sector, and improve the plight of the poor, we fear
Peru may face a strong increase in the nationalist, populist elements that
recently have come to power in other Latin American countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia. This result would not of
necessity predict adoption of an anti-capitalist policy—although both the
Andean Community of Nations and MERCOSUR may forever be changed
by recent events167—but it is certain to work a diversion from the longterm infrastructural and institutional reform necessary to ensure Peru’s
future economic success.

163. Bilateral Trade Agreement Helps Vietnam Attract Surge in Investment Since ’01, 23 BNA
INT’L TRADE REP. 315 (Mar. 2, 2006).
164. Cruz, Betanzos, Lizarraga, Dias, REPERCUCIONES DEL TLC EN LAS FINANZAS DE LAS
EMPRESAS MEXICANAS [TLC’s Impact in the Economy of Mexican Corporations] 125 (Sicco
1998).
165. One expert estimates that Peru needs US$24 billion to catch up with the level of
infrastructure in Colombia and Chile. Carlos Patrón, Globalization and Neo-Nationalism through
the Lens of the Peru-U.S. FTA, Lecture at Univ. of Fla. Levin College of Law, Feb. 24, 2006 (on
file with authors).
166. Id.
167. Juan Forero, Now the Hard Part: Bolivia Faces Pitfalls of Gas Takeover, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2006, at A10.
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The FTA will make possible diversification of the labor-intensive
sectors in Peru’s economy, such as agriculture and textiles. Under the
Andean Trade Preference and Development Act and its predecessor,168
production since 2002 of asparagus, mangos, limes, onions, and other
newly developed export crops has created 350,000 new jobs.169 New textile
and apparel exports have resulted in 190,000 new jobs.170 Together,
agriculture and textiles have doubled Peru’s exports, a telling predictor of
the future when one considers the small size and limited agricultural
commodities involved in this trade.171 Tourism is booming, and
opportunities for expansion of that sector through eco-tourism in Iquitos
and the rainforest region have enormous potential. Costa Rica is a model
in that respect, hosting 1.4 million eco-tourists each year in a country of
only 14 million.172 Even as Brazil was failing to deliver on its plan to
entitle 1.5 million families with property rights, Peru has in fact done just
that, carrying forward on Hernando De Soto’s findings of the deadweight
losses of informal land tenure and the benefits of enfranchising the people
with their own piece of economic potential by privatizing public lands.173
We do not contend that this level of private land ownership is sufficient to
ensure full and zealous participation of the private sector in the economic
growth predicted by the trade agreement. It is, however, an important start.
The Peru-U.S. Free Trade Agreement continues for Peru on a
permanent basis the preferential tariff rates the country enjoyed under the
Andean trade preference laws174 and, therefore, makes possible additional
infrastructural investments, such as irrigation projects, that will be needed
to put to use the 50% of arable lands not currently under production.
Because of its closeness to the equator, Peru enjoys a four to six week
lead in harvesting seasons on Chile, its principal competitor for
agricultural exports to the United States. Peru is the price leader during
this critical period. U.S. investors have begun since the turn of the century
to realize the importance of this fact by purchasing arable lands in Peru.
Investment should surge with the protections offered to foreign funding by

168. Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 102-182, tit. II (1991), revised and expanded
by the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, Pub. L. No. 207-2210, tit. XXXI
(2002).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Sittenfeld, supra note 77.
173. Patrón, supra note 154.
174. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PROPOSED UNITED STATES—PERU TPA
TEXTS, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Draft_Texts/Section_Index.
html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
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the Peru-U.S. agreement’s investment chapter, which recreates the
NAFTA’s guarantees of equitable treatment and safety from regulatory
expropriation.175
From Mexico to Chile, a principal reason for opposing free trade with
developed countries is the loss of agricultural jobs—together with a rural
way of life—necessitated by opening the smaller country’s market to agribusiness powerhouses in the United States such as ADM and Cargill. Peru
is positioned to avoid much of this downside of opening its borders to the
global market. Only seven agricultural crops potentially compete with U.S.
crops for the domestic Peruvian market and U.S. growers presently import
only two of these crops into Peru. The agreement provides a transition
period for these seven tariff-sensitive crops. In fact, in the case of most
agricultural consumption in Peru, U.S. producers will be in competition
with producers in Argentina, from which Peru presently purchases most
of its grains. Highly-efficient grain producers in the United States can only
bring benefits to Peruvian consumers in the form of lower prices for grains
if these producers displace importers from other countries.
In our view, the conditions for expansion of both Peruvian and U.S.
investment in the agricultural and textile sectors are ideal. We take the
point made by Oswaldo Molina176 that the United States already had
reduced tariff barriers for Peruvian exporters 15 years ago through Andean
trade preference legislation.177 We believe that exports nonetheless will
increase. One reason will be the increased protection for foreign direct
investors provided for the first time through the new trade agreement.
These provisions make available to investors from the United States
protections previously available in Peru only for its Andean Pact
neighbors. The predictable business environment ensured by this chapter
will greatly spur U.S. investment in the most promising sectors of
Peruvian trade. Another reason is that the 10% of Peru’s exports to the
United States that were dutiable include those products that have the
greatest import sensitivity to U.S. producers and the greatest export value
to Peru, such as asparagus, sugar, and some textile products.178
With the huge untapped areas of arable land and the early harvest
seasons, agriculture is one of those sectors. Textiles and apparel is another.
The FTA increases the types of products eligible for duty-free treatment

175. FTA: A Tool to Generate Exportation Evolution, http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/index.
php?id_noticia=322#top.
176. Effects of the TLC with the U.S. Employment, supra note 157.
177. Andean Trade Promotion & Drug Eradication Act, supra note 168.
178. Lenore Sek, U.S. Congressional Research Service: Andean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations, at 5, 7, & 9 (June 29, 2005).
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and changes the rules of origin to permit increased imports of Peruvian
textile and apparel merchandise to the United States.179
Some of the sectors most likely to benefit from the FTA are the midsize and micro-enterprises. These companies not only have the opportunity
to enter the world’s largest market, but also—as a result of lowered tariffs
for U.S. imports, can buy machinery and supplies at lower prices, which
will contribute to higher efficiency and productivity. The FTA also may
stimulate joint ventures between small Peruvian companies and larger U.S.
investors.180
The Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism has
expressed the government’s intention to employ all possible mechanisms
to protect market-sensitive products and make the changes necessary for
farmers to improve conditions of production of current plantings or to
switch acreage to more profitable crops.181 Tariffs for market-sensitive
products will be removed gradually over a period of 12 to 19 years, and
quotas in the meantime will protect Peru’s most sensitive products, mainly
agricultural commodities in which U.S. producers are dominant. However,
these quotas begin at under 10% of annual Peruvian production and
increase annually until both tariffs and quotas are completely removed.182
The General Department of Economic Studies of the Peruvian Ministry
of Foreign Commerce and Tourism estimates that as a consequence of the
FTA the number of jobs in the export sector would increase by 123,000,
which would bring to 1.2 million the number of jobs directly and indirectly
related to the export sector.183
It has been argued that the large U.S. subsidies to its agriculture sector
will adversely affect Peruvian producers by creating an uneven playing
field for competition. However, it must be noted that of the 1100
agricultural products, the United States subsidizes only fourteen.184 Of
those fourteen products, seven are not produced in Peru and thus do not
create concerns for the Peruvian agricultural industry. Of the remaining
seven products that compete with Peruvian products, only two are
imported principally from the United States. The five remaining products
are imported primarily from neighboring countries that do not subsidize
at all, and thus present a level playing field for Peruvian producers.185 This
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180.
181.
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184.
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USTR Summary, supra note 102. See supra Part IV.D (giving further detail).
Key Notions, supra note 41.
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Id.
FTA & Agriculture, supra note 45.
Id.
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is not to say that U.S. producers of these products will not displace present
importers, but that Peruvian producers have already learned to be globally
competitive in these crops because of previous foreign competition.
The U.S. subsidy situation thus hangs in the background as a looming
threat to Peruvian farmers, making even more important successful
conclusion of the WTO’s Doha Development Round. However, Peru has
no intention of simply ignoring the U.S. subsidies, but instead will “fight
fire with fire.” That is, the government will directly compensate producers
of market-sensitive products such as cotton, corn, and wheat, which should
reduce the negative effects of imports on these farmers.186
In much the same way that agricultural production in the two countries
is primarily complementary, manufactured products also do not overlap.
The United States exports high technology assets such as machine tools
that are not produced in Peru, and thus the lowered tariffs on those goods
will not negatively affect the Peruvian manufacturing industry. The
reduction in tariffs will, in fact, have beneficial effects because it will
permit Peruvian manufacturers to buy needed supplies at more competitive
prices, which will reduce input costs.187 This result should be felt most
clearly by farmers, because the price of fertilizers as well as agricultural
equipment will be lower, which should in turn help to improve agricultural
productivity and diversification.188
Of the market-sensitive products—sugar, meat, rice, wheat, cotton,
corn, and milk—only three (cotton, corn, and wheat) could be substantially
affected by increased imports from the United States. To reduce any
immediate effects, the FTA sets quotas limiting entry of competing U.S.
products. If U.S. imports nonetheless increase so quickly that they cause
injury to Peruvian producers, Peru is permitted to implement special
safeguards to restrict the sudden increase of imports. Special restrictions
also may be put in place at the border international prices of the competing
prices drops.189
Moreover, Peru is in any event a net importer of cotton, purchasing
some US$60 million annually. Even without the transitional period for
Peruvian tariff reductions, U.S. cotton imports would not necessarily cause
injury to domestic cotton growers because the Peruvian textile industry
will have an increased demand for cotton under the FTA. As to corn and

186. BRUNO SEMINARIO DE MARZI, ARANCELES Y TLC, CORREO—YEAR XXI, EDITION 9271
[hereinafter ARANCELES Y TLC], http://www.correoperu.com.pe/paginas_columna.php?columna_
autor=Brunopercent20Seminario&seccion_nota=8&nota_id=14032 (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
187. Id.
188. FTA & Agriculture, supra note 45.
189. Id.

134

FLO RID A JOU RN AL O F IN TERNATIO N AL LAW

[V ol. 20

wheat, most of the domestic demand for yellow corn (80%) is met through
domestic production. The remaining 20% is supplied mostly by
Argentinean imports (75%). Similarly for wheat, domestic production
meets only 10% of Peruvian wheat demand and the remaining 90% is
supplied by imported wheat, again mainly from Argentina.190 In other
words, U.S. corn and wheat imports, even when tariffs are reduced
sufficiently to justify sale in Peru, likely will be displacing Argentinean
wheat, not domestic Peruvian production.
Under the agreement, the zero tariffs at the U.S. border created by the
Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act will continue.
However, on Peru’s part, tariff reduction will occur slowly over a 10-year
period in order to minimize the costs of opening Peru’s borders to
competitive U.S. imports. This additional time will give Peruvian
industries a transitional period to become more competitive.191
C. Indirect Effects
By increasing employment and income levels, FTAs can of course
create amplified indirect growth, primarily through added consumption
and increased investment by the domestic private sector. Further,
employment should thereby be created, although the displacement of local
products by imports can offset this effect in part. Importantly, these
indirect multiplier effects, unlike the direct effects on particular industries,
have the capacity to bring benefits to the economy as a whole. Speaking
generally of fiscal effects, the expected outcome of the reduction in tariff
income, which in Peru represents some 10% of government revenue, is
that these taxes will be offset by increased tax revenue flowing from
higher economic growth by civil society as a whole.192
D. Long Term Effects
Without trade, there would be no export revenues to fund social and
infrastructure projects than can target poverty alleviation on a local level.
These increased export revenues also are critical for paying off
international debts. One program in Mexico seeks to tie rural poverty
assistance measures to child education, requiring children to enroll full
time in school before their parents are eligible for government assistance.
Programs such as this have the potential to benefit Latin America’s poor,

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. ARANCELES Y TLC, supra note 186.
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but without the revenues generated by trade, such programs could not
exist.193
An additional probable long term effect of the FTA relates to
technology transfer between the United States and Peru. The Agreement
seeks in the intellectual property rights chapter to promote technological
capacity, which Peru dearly needs to raise the level of skilled employment
in which its workers may engage, through “collaborative research
projects” and other means.194 The authors are convinced that Peru should
embrace technological opportunities such as these with both arms.
Increased employment from expansion of the agricultural and textile
sectors will continue to be lower paying jobs. Jobs that command higher
levels of compensation can only follow attainment of higher skill levels,
such as those promised by the technical sector. Mexico has been able to
develop its technological sector in such areas as automobile and consumer
electronics assembly.195 Costa Rica’s educational successes recently were
rewarded with a major new investment by Intel. Positions in these sectors
pay substantially higher wages than those in the agriculture and textile
sectors while demanding only minimally greater technical training. Peru’s
National Council for Science and Technological Innovation has been
designated as the lead agency for this work,196 and the Government of Peru
should ensure its adequate funding and priority to take full advantage of
the opportunity presented for collaborative projects with the advanced
scientific institutions of government and the academy in the United States.
With respect to the labor rights of Peru’s workers, Peru has made
substantial progress in reforming its labor laws. Some have said that
deficiencies remain in particular—and Peru is by no means alone in Latin
America in this respect—with respect to laws guaranteeing freedom of
association and the right to form unions. The Agreement provides in the
labor chapter the opportunity for Peru to push toward full compliance with
International Labor Organization standards in this and all other respects.
In particular, we see substantial opportunities exchange of information on
best practices and ways to improve them.197 This provision presents the
challenge to Peru’s Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion to learn
from the mistakes and successes of the United States, including its

193. Id.
194. Peru-U.S. Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 16.12.1 (Dec. 7, 2005), www.sice.oas.org/
TPD/AND_USA/PER_USA/Draft_text_e/index_e.asp.
195. Robert E. Scott, The High Price of Free Trade, ECON. POL. INST., Nov. 17, 2003, http://
www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_bp147.
196. Peru-U.S. Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 194, art. 16.12.3(a).
197. Id. art. 17.4.6(b)(iii).
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powerful labor unions, and to become a model of labor rights protection
in the hemisphere. The opportunity is there for the taking, and the reward
is not simply implementation of the human rights of Peru’s workers.
Compliance with ILO treaties will lead to a more productive work force
that is delivering its best effort to excel in the global market.
As mentioned in Part I, one of the objectives of this Essay is to unravel
the possible contributions of the Peru-U.S. FTA to the rule of law. We
emphasize that trade alone cannot create equitable distribution of its
economic benefits. Government use of the increased taxation revenue and
other growth potential is crucial to that end.
The Peru-U.S. FTA contains provisions that require the government to
conduct its activities through a more transparent and expeditious process,
a process that relies exclusively on an administrative record created with
input from all affected members of civil society, and one whose rules, as
well as their implementation by the governmental agencies, are subject to
substantive review by an independent and accessible judiciary, contribute
to enjoyment by civil society in general, not solely to those involved in
international trade, of rules-based governance.198
These unheralded effects include provisions that encourage
transparency, accountability, and due process by governments, in effect
lending a “helping hand” to Peru’s forward-thinking government to
advance the participation of civil society in its decisional processes in
order both to establish the nation’s democracy and to make civil society,
in general, a winner in international trade’s marketplace. Likewise, the
dispute settlement systems provided for in the Peru-U.S. FTA similarly
promote timeliness, inclusive record keeping, and impartiality in the
administrative decisional process. For example, Chapter 19 of the PeruU.S. FTA requires that rules applicable to importers and investors be
easily available and open to any interested persons and parties, and that
any changes to such rules be adopted in a process that is open to the
affected public and accounts for public input.199
The fact that decisions made by national authorities affecting importers
and investors will often be subject to dispute settlement under the FTA
198. Chapter 8 Trade Remedies (art. 8.3, Investigation Procedures and Transparency
Requirements, art. 8.4, Notification and Consultation); Chapter 10 Investment (art. 10.14: Special
Formalities and Information Requirements, art. 10.15: Consultation and Negotiation, art. 10.16:
Submission of a Claim to Arbitration, art. 10.21, Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings, Annex 10F, Special Dispute Settlement Provisions); Chapter Sixteen Intellectual Property Rights (art. 16.1,
General Provisions, ¶ 14, Transparency); Chapter 17 Labor (art. 17.3, Procedural Guarantees and
Public Awareness, Annex 17.5.4. Public Participation); Chapter 19 Transparency.
199. Statements by participants in 2004 Conference on Legal and Policy Issues in the
Americas, San José, Costa Rica (June 24, 2004) (on file with authors).
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may work a substantial change in the government’s decisionmaking
process. For example, the responding government normally will want the
dispute settlement panel to have access to the “administrative record” upon
which the decision was based in order to show compliance with the treaty
provisions the complaining government has alleged were violated.
The fate of the agency decision will rely on the completeness of this
record in setting out the evidence relied upon and its relation to the trade
agreement’s obligations. When effective dispute settlement is available in
a trade agreement, national authorities may have strong incentives to
follow a very different decisional process than previously may have been
required by domestic law to implement the agreement’s obligations.
Creation of an administrative record anticipates, for example, that
evidence upon which the decision is based will be explicitly identified and
placed in the file of the measure and, additionally, mandates that the
analysis of the agency be committed to paper and assigned to the file.
Clearly, these steps transform the decision process into a rules-based
mechanism, rather than one that flows from the opinions of agency
officials alone. This approach inevitably ensures greater openness in the
decision process for all affected interests, both foreign and domestic.
The dispute settlement mechanisms of the FTA may serve foreign
interests as alternatives to less developed and robust judicial systems in
smaller economies such as the Peruvian economy. FTA processes for
resolving interpretive conflict are effective either in securing changes to
national measures found to be in violation; if the losing party does not
comply with the decision by bringing its measure into compliance;
providing for compensation to the winning party; if the level of
compensation cannot be agreed, or permitting retaliation by the winning
party in the amount of the damage suffered by its private companies in lost
trade.
The FTA’s dispute settlement system also has measures designed to
secure neutral panelists to review the national measure and provides
sources of law for the dispute panel to apply that are harmonized for the
FTA parties. These provisions should result in a business environment that
is “friendlier” to a foreign interest than national rules on the subject. Trade
dispute settlement systems often provide for expeditious relief,
recognizing that, to a business engaged in the fast-paced global market,
slow resolution of conflict essentially deprives the business of any relief
at all.
These elements of a “binding” process for resolving commercial
conflicts may provide more meaningful relief than national courts for
foreign companies involved in trade with an FTA country that has imposed
measures allegedly inconsistent with FTA terms. In fact, trade agreements
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may directly mandate changes to national court systems, as is the case with
provisions requiring that review of governmental trade measures be made
by tribunals that are independent of the agency deciding the measure, such
as Article 19.5 of the Peru-U.S. FTA.200 For these same reasons, trade
dispute settlement also may serve as prototype for the further evolution of
the judicial systems in the FTA parties. In effect, this aspect translates into
trade dispute settlement making itself obsolete.
In sum, dispute settlement under the trade and investment provisions
of the FTA aims to eliminate any role for nationalism or other bias in
reviewing whether the border measure or other governmental activity is
consistent with the FTA’s obligations, thus promoting a rules-based
approach to the national regulatory processes of the FTA partners. From
a somewhat broader perspective, the stability of national regulations
promoted by FTA becomes an end in itself, because predictability is one
of the strongest motivators of businesses to trade with and invest in a
particular country. In order to continue the economic growth stimulated by
a predictable set of rules, nations may be encouraged by these provisions
to pursue a system of governance with fuller foundations in
democratically-enacted and consistently-applied rules.
Nonetheless, we are aware of certain skepticism as to our premise.
Some argue that trade agreements have no legitimate role in examination
of progress in rule of law principles, either because (1) human rights issues
interfere with obtaining maximum economic benefit of the agreement; or
(2) rule of law deficiencies, whether reflected in weak judiciaries or
corrupt licensing systems, persist because powerful interests want them
that way and no glancing blow from an impartiality provision in an FTA
will change that weakness in the system; or (3) social developments such
as rules-based governance, like other aspects of nation-building,
legitimately may be accomplished only from within the country, although,
admittedly, outside forces (such as FTAs) can facilitate the process.201
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pablo de la Flor, Peruvian Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and chief of
the FTA negotiating team, summarized the post-FTA situation as follows:
Now that the FTA negotiations with the U.S. have culminated,
Peru counts on a new tool to generate a true exportation revolution

200. Id.
201. Id.
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and a real transformation of the national productive system. The
FTA has also provided us the basis for clear and certain laws for
investors which would encourage foreign investment.
This agreement places in the national agenda important changes
and reforms which are essential in order to consolidate Peru as a
productive, stable, and fair country leader in Latin America.
Therefore, this agreement constitutes a legacy for future
governments which would provide resources to combat poverty,
generate employment, and increase the consumption levels of the
Peruvian citizens.202
We began our Essay with the suggestion that trade negotiators and
governments implementing FTAs could take “small steps” toward
improvement of worker rights, protection of the environment, and
preservation of indigenous cultures. These measures, we believe, could be
adopted without impeding the economic benefits promised by the trade
liberalization efforts represented by the FTA. Peru has already begun these
efforts with special legislation to protect indigenous lands from
development.203 One of these small steps is retraining of rural populations
that, because of their small size and unsophisticated agricultural
techniques, may be unable to compete with imports from the large agrobusiness corporations in the United States.
The government has several options toward this end. The first option
is to offer these farmers adequate training and transitional economic
assistance needed to modernize their farming techniques and become more
competitive in the global market. A second option is to provide the farmers
the necessary training and resources to replace their crops with those that
will allow them to have a competitive advantage in the international
market. The third option is providing training for those farmers that could
not be retrained in the agricultural sector in order to integrate them into a
different economic sector that will benefit from increased trade, such as
mining and professional services.
Peru has begun to implement a trade adjustment assistance program.
Implementation of the trade agreement with the United States should be
accompanied by a major expansion of that program if Peru is to ameliorate

202. Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Commerce and Tourism, TLC: Herramienta para generar
revolución exportadora [TLC: Tool to Generate Revolution Exporting], Lima, Dec. 11, 2005,
http://www.tlcperu-eeuu.gob.pe/index.php?id_noticia=322#top.
203. Ministerio de Agricultura, supra note 61.
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the industry-shifting effects of opening to full competition from the United
States. Cushioning the negative effects of free trade is both a necessary
function of government and a necessary predicate for continued support
of free trade. The labor chapter of the Agreement commits the United
States to cooperation in worker retraining and assistance.204 The U.S.
Department of Labor has gained substantial experience in administering
the trade adjustment assistance program in the United States. This
experience could permit Peru to avoid the mistakes made by the United
States in the early years of the program and to implement trade adjustment
assistance in a manner that will cushion the necessary but devastating
retrenchments in industry employment that accompany open borders.
These alternatives should be accompanied by government incentives
to encourage the private sector to invest in projects such as the
modernization of agriculture, substitution of crops, and development of
different economic sectors that have been ignored and which possess great
potential for wealth and success. The question these alternatives pose is
where to find the financial resources needed to carry out the required
educational and training programs and other economic help essential to
further counteract the negative effects of competing with one of the most
efficient economies in the world.
Despite its many flaws, the unquestionable answer is to strengthen
trade. As summarized in a report from the well-regarded Institute for
International Economics in Washington, D.C.,
[T]he biggest source of concern [is] the evident hostility in the
region to the idea of using the market economy as the basic mode
of economic organization. Good macro policy is not of much
consequence without vibrant supply-side growth. . . . Distribution
has often been wrongly derided, but nonetheless it remains true that
one needs to have a lot of output before one can worry about how
to distribute it. All the evidence suggests that one needs a thriving
private sector nurtured by a competitive market economy for rapid
and sustained increase in output. Yet this view is not dominant in
Latin America. That is a threat to the future.205

204. Peru—U.S. Trade Promotion Agreement, ch. 17, art. 17.5.2. (Dec. 7, 2005),
http://ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file848_
8711.pdf.
205. John Williamson, After the Washington Consensus: Latin American Growth and
Sustainable Development, Inst. for Int’l Econs. (Mar. 30, 2006), at 8, http://www.iie.com/
publications/papers/williamson0306.pdf.
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To the extent that Peru becomes a more open, diversified economy and
creates a clearer and more predictable regulatory environment, exports and
local and foreign investment will increase, and the flow of money in the
economy will follow suit. In short, despite the fact that globalization and
trade may not have created the large middle class to which economically
disadvantaged members of society aspire, the only way to reach this
objective is through additional trade.206 The marginalized members of
society will not reap trade’s gains overnight, especially in a country such
as Peru in which higher-paying jobs do not rely solely on gaining global
market share by developing products or services in which Peru has a
comparative advantage. Increasing the educational and skill levels of
workers is also necessary to create better paying jobs. Wise government
decisions will be needed over the next generation to push the additional
state wealth that will follow from the FTA with the United States and other
trade liberalization downward to the workers while not impeding the
country’s active capitalists from also benefiting from their risk-taking in
the global market.
Another step that should be considered is the implementation of
educational programs to provide technological training and develop the
high-technology sector. Increased trade in Peru today can create mostly
low-paying jobs in the labor-intensive textile and agriculture sectors.
These jobs will have value because they are, after all, better than no jobs
at all and continued high unemployment in the formal and informal
economies. These new jobs will reduce unemployment and, as a matter of
course, poverty levels. However, only a long-term investment in increasing
educational opportunities for Peru’s civil society can deliver the higherpaying jobs that will enable these workers to join Peru’s nascent middle
class. Achieving a higher educational level of the populace will take a
continuing commitment of many years.
To reach this objective, Peru must diversify its economy to reduce
reliance on the agricultural sector, which is subject to fierce global
competition. Development of the technological sector may allow Peru to
acquire a certain level of independence from foreign technology and would
create a more stable market for their products, attract investors, and
increase formal employment levels.
The Peru-U.S. FTA has a very important provision concerning
cooperation mechanisms regarding labor and capacity-building matters.

206. Clive Crook, Globalization and Its Critics, ECONOMIST, (Sept. 27, 2001), at 3; Carlos
Patrón, Globalization and Neo-Nationalism Through the Lens of the Peru—United States Free
Trade Agreement, Lecture at Univ. of Fla. College of Law (Feb. 24, 2006) (on file with authors).
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Annex 17.5 provides for pursuit of bilateral or regional cooperation
activities on labor issues, such as programs for social assistance, skill
development, training and worker adjustments, programs to promote new
employment opportunities, and workforce modernization.207 These
programs should include employment services and the promotion of
fundamental workers rights, improvement of work conditions,
competitiveness, and productivity levels, as well as public awareness of
relevant laws, among others.
In order to implement cooperative activities, Annex 17.5 provides for
technical assistance programs, including providing human, technical, and
material resources, exchange of official delegations, professionals, and
specialists.208 These cooperation activities could help the Government of
Peru to ensure the effectiveness of educational and training programs and
to strengthen the technical and technological sectors with the greatest
potential for positive impacts on the Peruvian economy.
An important step that should also be considered is negotiation of trade
agreements and other economic alliances with countries such as China, the
European Union, as well as further arrangements with neighboring
countries. This trade diversification would allow Peru to find alternative
markets for its products and reduce its reliance on the U.S. market. The
Andean Community has created a watershed moment for Peru with its
invitation to that country’s Southern neighbor, Chile, to rejoin the pact
which Chile left during the Fujimori reign in the mid-1970s. Chile’s free
trade policies and its proximity have made that country Peru’s largest
export market. Peru can parlay the changing face of the Andean
Community into an unprecedented opportunity to join Chile as a major
export platform to service the seemingly-insatiable mineral and
agricultural demands of China and other Pacific Rim nations.209
The option to make of trade a mechanism to improve the living
conditions of its citizens or to make of trade a vehicle that further increases
the gap between rich and poor is in the government’s hands. Trade and
democracy share a symbiotic role. Capitalism, as realized through the open
markets and minimal interference at the border mandated by global and
regional trade rules, is a necessary but insufficient condition to democracy.
Trade brings the economic growth that raises living standards, thus
permitting civil society to participate in democratic governance.210

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Carlos M. Paz-Soldan, Guest Comment, in LATIN AMERICAN ADVISOR 4 (Aug. 10, 2006),
available at www.thedialogue.org (on file with authors).
210. Robert J. Samuelson, Capitalism vs. Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 2005, at 47.
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Democratic governance makes possible the social measures that cushion
trade’s growing pains, its transfer of jobs to sectors with the lowest
opportunity costs.211
Trade alone can neither establish democratic governance nor ensure
observance of human rights. Only governments can accomplish these
objectives. However, trade agreements, especially regional agreements
among close trading partners, can lend a helping hand toward these ends.
If trade negotiators fail to use trade’s great power to promote human
rights—an objective promised by all members of the United
Nations212—the result will be substantially slowing of progress toward the
objectives of both trade and human rights.
Free trade and the economic growth it brings can help establish
democracy if governments ensure that the economic gains created by trade
are diverted in part to the infrastructural and institutional improvements
necessary for civil society’s full participation in trade’s benefits. This
lesson resonates with special relevance in Latin America, where
authoritarian regimes are part of a very recent past. We may find comfort
in the fact that the democratic era of the past two decades has witnessed
only one classic military coup since 1990—in Haiti. However, we must
also face the fact that 15 hemispheric presidents since that time have been
unable to complete their terms.213 Establishing democracy in Latin
America as the steadfast form of government such as India or the United
States, as opposed to creating democratic governance in the first instance,
will require governments to make substantial improvements to
infrastructure and education, and to equalize enjoyment of trade’s benefits.
As the Government of Peru has recognized, a stable legal framework
is also a necessary prerequisite to attracting foreign and domestic
investment.214 The FTA with the United States will have the effect of
reducing the risk associated with foreign investment in Peru and will for
that reason stimulate additional venture capital with the employment gains
this new money will bring.215 With the reduction in risk associated with
investment, long term interest rates also should fall, furnishing further
incentives for both domestic and foreign investment.216
211. Paul Krugman, The Trade Tightrope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at 2A. See also Robert
J. Samuelson, China, Trade and Progress, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 2004, at 47.
212. U.N. Charter art. 103.
213. Arturo Valenzuela, The U.S. and Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era: More of the
Same?, Keynote Address at “A Celebration of 75 Years of Latin American Studies at the University
of Florida” (Feb. 16, 2006) (on file with authors).
214. Ministerio de Agricultura, supra note 61.
215. Effects of the TLC with the U.S. Employment, supra note 157.
216. Key Notions, supra note 41.
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Successful, stable governments are hardly the rule in the Western
Hemisphere. In some ways, the work of Chile’s Ricardo Lagos Escobar
could be seen as a model. When Mr. Lagos left office in March 2006 after
six years, he was more popular than when he entered, an unusual
accomplishment indeed. During Mr. Lagos’s tenure, for example, two
neighboring countries, Argentina and Bolivia, experienced six different
presidents, two of whom were toppled by popular uprisings. By combining
cautious economic policies with advances in social equality and human
rights, Lagos built a level of respect that cuts across class and generational
lines. President Lagos calmed the powerful business elite by continuing
the principal economic policies of his predecessors, pursuing budget
surpluses and other programs to stimulate exports. “But with copper prices
at a record high and the economy growing faster than in any other in South
America, he could also afford to let the military acquire new weapons
while investing in health, education, and housing programs for the
poor.”217 We do not claim that Peru’s situation is identical to that in Chile,
but a delicate combination of stimulation of infrastructural growth while
business at the same time is permitted to reap the profits earned by its
efforts should be the objective of government implementation efforts.
With Peru’s mining industry booming and recent increase in domestic
investments in copper,218 now may be the time to expand the benefits of
these zinc, copper, gold, and molybdenum riches to a greater proportion
of civil society through job creation programs and similar means.
We do not believe it is alarmist to recognize the fact that if in the next
five years Peru is not able to use the impetus of its FTA with the United
States to distribute more equitably the nation’s increased economic
growth, the nationalistic and populist elements that have risen in several
Latin American nations will not long lay dormant in Peru, particularly in
light of Peru’s populist political past. If these elements result in
abandonment of free market capitalism, rather than turning market
fundamentalism into a vehicle to promote human rights, we fear the
outcome will be further delay in realization of Peru’s potential for both
economic and human rights growth.
Government must encourage joint projects among universities, other
research centers, and producers to retrain workers in order to take full
advantage of technological innovations. This effort will be especially

217. Larry Rohter, Chile’s Socialist President Exits Enjoying Wide Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/11/international/americas/
11chile.html?pagewanted=all.
218. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Peru, Mar. 2008, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgm/35762.htm (last visited May 8, 2008).
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important to agriculture, which is vulnerable to import competition, but
this approach will benefit all small businesses in general.219 These efforts
to strengthen the linkages between the knowledge centers and the potential
knowledge users in the business community are necessary steps to take
advantage of the new technologies so essential to solving the social and
environmental challenges that Peru faces.220
Chapter 18 of the FTA on the environment contains the seeds of a
governmental implementation program that could significantly improve
the situation of Peru’s indigenous populations. While the language fell
short of the aspirations of Peru that patent applicants must reveal the
source and origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge used in
their inventions, as well as share the benefits with the source of the
traditional knowledge if the resource is commercially exploited, there is
reason to hope that Peru will use the ambiguity of the provision in its favor
when drafting the implementing legislation.
Through Article 18.8, “[t]he Parties recognize the importance of
respecting and preserving traditional knowledge and practices of
indigenous and other communities that contribute to the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity,” the Peruvian Government should
ensure that the large U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical companies work
closely with Peruvian governmental agencies in bioprospecting of Peru’s
genetic resources for the future medical health of the general public.221
Further, support for an aggressive approach by Peru in putting Chapter 18
into place is furnished by the Understanding Regarding Biodiversity and
Traditional Knowledge that accompanies the FTA and amplifies the
environment chapter’s intent: “The Parties recognize the importance of the
following: (1) obtaining informed consent from the appropriate authority
prior to accessing genetic resources under the control of such authority; (2)
equitably sharing the benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge
and genetic resources; and (3) promoting quality patent examination to
ensure the conditions of patentability are satisfied.”222 While this
Understanding falls short of binding language, the Peruvian Government’s
proven commitment to protecting the future of both its indigenous
populations and its rich biodiversity should lead to the maximum leverage
possible to make further advances toward its original negotiating
objectives. Peru has already succeeded in obtaining the strongest
environmental chapter ever negotiated by the United States. Peru’s

219.
220.
221.
222.

Key Notions, supra note 41.
Oliva et al., supra note 34.
EGG, supra note 81.
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Government should continue its victory with strong implementing
language.
In fact, a cooperative scientific entity that would jointly apply for
patents and simultaneously ensure that the indigenous populations of Peru
that have for centuries preserved and nurtured these genetic resources, as
well as uncovered their medical uses, will share in the profits generated by
development of these resources, while at the same time guaranteeing
adequate habitat for the genetic resources.223 Peru has been vigilant in its
advancement of the rights of its indigenous people. In 2002, Peru joined
13 other countries as the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries to
advocate at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development
for recognition of the rights of indigenous populations to their traditional
knowledge and fair and equitable sharing by these peoples in the benefits
that flow from modern uses of genetic resources.224
The Convention on Biological Diversity also furnishes powerful
ammunition for Peru’s work to improve the situation of its indigenous
peoples. The Convention recognizes the intimate relationship between
preservation of biodiversity and protection of the traditional knowledge of
indigenous populations.225 We hope that Peru completes the circle by
providing the needed legal framework for access to the genetic resources,
equitable sharing of the economic value contributed by the indigenous
population and by the developer of the resource, and technology transfer
that applies in both directions.226
On a broader environmental scale, Peru also should consider further
negotiations with the United States to fund specific environmental projects
such as those included in the Chile-U.S. FTA.227 Efforts to improve
pollutant data bases, to improve water quality and to make agricultural
practices more eco-friendly, among others, would be as valuable in Peru
as they are in Chile. This kind of cooperation can make the Environment
Chapter a solidly positive source for environmental protection.228
Mexico’s experience has proven that increased competitiveness is not
guaranteed by signing an FTA. Greater competitiveness will flow,
however, from an FTA combined with governmental improvement of
223. Id. at 95.
224. U.N. Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development ¶ 15 , ch. IX (Sept. 4,
2002).
225. Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818, 837 (1992).
226. Sittenfeld, supra note 77.
227. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, ch. 19, Annex 19.3, Office of U.S. Trade Rep.,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/
asset_upload_file482_4013.pdf.
228. Id.
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physical infrastructure (ports, airports, highways), transportation
services,229 and increased educational opportunities in the sciences and
technology for all segments of Peruvian society.

229. Key Notions, supra note 41.
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